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LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMISM, RELIABILITY: THE
RISE AND FALL OF CALFED
BY
DAVE OWEN*
Tus Article examines the conceptual frameworks often used to
understand and resolve controversies involving scarce and legally
protected natural resources. It proposes that traditional frameworks,
though ingrained in legal structures and conventional expectations, fail
to adequately address tensions between resource consumption,
environmental protection, and the reliability of resource allocation
patterns, and thus can induce adoption of solutions that prove fragile in
contexts of environmental uncertainty and change. It then proposes a
different conceptual approach capable of facilitating more lasting
solutions. The Atdcle illustrates the importance of that conceptual shift
by analyzing an important environmental controversy in California.
Efforts to resolve that controversy, though widely praised in the legal
academic literature, have not succeeded, and this Article proposes that
those failings partly reflect conceptual frameworks ill-suited for
dynamic and uncertain environmental conditions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a typical river somewhere in the American west. Farms rely on
its waters and divert much of its flow to irrigated fields. Cities depend upon
it for domestic and industrial water supply. Despite diversions, dams, and
exotic invaders, native species survive, albeit tenuously. Many of those
species are legally protected, and some are quite economically valuable, or
at least could be if their populations recovered. A variety of agencies, both
federal and state, manage the river in accordance with complex politics and
laws. While the agencies' agendas differ in some ways, they share the
common goal of achieving a stable balance among its competing uses, and
they possess, at least in theory, the money and expertise to achieve that
goal. If they fail, the consequences will be troubling: species may go extinct;
non-compliance with environmental laws could lead to citizen suits or
agency enforcement actions, which could leave irrigators or cities without
badly-needed water; and litigation, political conflict, and economic and
social dislocation are all but inevitable.' Yet, if this river is like many real
rivers throughout the west, or like many forests, fisheries, air basins, or
other natural systems presenting similar challenges to environmental
managers,2 the chances of such failure are high. This Article explores why
those problems so often recur.
The reasons are invariably complex, and this Article does not explore
them all. Political process quirks, skewed economic incentives, ideological
1 See, e.g., Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fsh, Fans, and the Clash of Cultures in the
ilamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 283-84 (2003) (describing the costs of water use
conflicts); see also JAY LUND ET AL., ENVISIONING FUTURES FOR THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN
DELTA 105 (2007) [hereinafter ENVISIONING FUTURES] (estimating the costs of a sudden cutoff of
Bay-Delta water at $10 billion per year). For a discussion of similar problems arising from forest
management, see STEPHEN YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OWL (1994).
2 I use the term environmental managers to refer to government agencies and the staff they
employ, acting in both regulatory and proprietary capacities. "Environmental laws" here is an
umbrella term referring both to laws traditionally understood as controlling pollution, like the
Clean Air Act, and to laws understood as resource management statutes, like the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act. Law school curricula sometimes distinguish the two groups, but in practice
the distinctions are muddy. The Clean Water Act, for example, is an environmental quality law
with significant resource-allocation implications.
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hostility to environmental protection, and a variety of other causes-all
heavily analyzed by legal scholars-often contribute to failures. But the core
thesis of this Article is that an additional factor deserves attention, and that
the road to ruin is often smoothed by legal concepts. Flaws in our basic
framework for understanding resource crises-a conceptual framework that
both flows from and influences the legal schemes that govern resource
management-play an important role in undermining efforts to achieve
stability.
Environmental managers often think they should balance
environmental protection and resource consumption in a particular way:
they think they should allow resource consumption right up to perceived
brinks of illegality and should provide just enough protection to avoid legal
violations, but no more. That understanding follows logically from our legal
systems, which often encourage resource consumption and environmental
protection but do little to promote preservation of margins for error. A
variety of legal and policy responses flow from that conceptual approach,
including selection of management systems designed to allow, facilitate, or
subsidize increased consumption even of scarce resources, but also
designed to penalize any activity that pushes environmental degradation
beyond the perceived brink. But because environmental conditions often
change, frequently in unexpected and dramatic ways, brinks of illegality can
be shifting and difficult to discern, and resource management schemes
deriving from that basic approach often require rapid adjustment. And if, as
is often the case, adjusting is institutionally or politically difficult, 3 that
traditional approach can lead to fragile solutions prone to costly collapses.
This Article therefore articulates a different conceptual framework designed
to preserve the durability and reliability4 of resource allocations even in a
changing, unpredictable world.
This Article illustrates the importance of that conceptual shift by
analyzing one of the nation's highest-proffle environmental controversies.
Approximately forty miles northeast of San Francisco, in California's Central
Valley, the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers flow through a maze of
channels and sloughs before discharging into San Francisco Bay. The Bay-
Delta, as that estuary is called, is one of California's most valuable natural
resources. Its watershed supplies most Californians with drinking water,
irrigates millions of acres of agricultural land, supports recreational uses
ranging from birdwatching to wakeboarding, and provides crucial habitat for
diverse fish and wildlife species, many of which are threatened or
3 Adjustment, of which "adaptive management" is a particular form, is very much in vogue
as an environmental management technique, but it has limitations. See generally Holly
Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges
of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 55 (2001) (describing tensions
between adaptive management's premise of uncertainty and institutional preferences for
finality).
4 By "reliable," I mean stable and predictable, but not necessarily abundant. See THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 562 (2d ed. 2000) (defining reliable: "[tihat may be relied upon; in
which reliance or confidence may be put; trustworthy, safe, sure").
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endangered.5 Balancing these often-competing needs is challenging, and the
watershed has generated some of the longest-lasting battles in California's
water wars.
6
Those battles have created a legal laboratory, in which the state and
federal governments have tested many approaches to environmental
management. Dozens of published cases, many groundbreaking, have
emerged from the Bay-Delta's conflicts.7 Congress and the California
Legislature have repeatedly intervened, first authorizing exploitation of the
Bay-Delta and then drafting laws designed to protect it.' In the shadow of
those legal constraints, agencies and interest groups employed novel
institutional arrangements and innovative regulatory techniques, many in
5 See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, STILL IMPERILED, STILL IMPORTANT: THE LITTLE HOOVER
COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM 3-4 (2005); CALFED BAY-DELTA
PROGRAM, PROGRAMMATIC RECORD OF DECISION 1-2 (2000) [hereinafter CALFED ROD].
6 See LrTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the Delta as the "battleground
for the state's perennial water war").
7 See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (denying private right of action to
challenge construction and operation of diversion facilities); Cent. Delta Water Agency V.
Bureau of Reclamation, 452 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a challenge to a federal plan to
release water to comply with fish habitat restoration requirements); Westlands Water Dist. v.
United States, 337 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (resolving a dispute among Central Valley Project
contractors); O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995) (addressing environmental
limitations on water deliveries); San Francisco Baykeeper V. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 219 F.
Supp. 2d 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting challenges to port dredging and berth renovation
projects); Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (holding
that Endangered Species Act-based restrictions on contractually conferred water rights
constitutes a taking); State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674 (2006)
(examining multiple regulatory actions of the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB));
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envti. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 133 Cal. App. 4th
154 (2005) (addressing challenges to CALFED Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement/Environmental Impact Report (CALFED EIR) certified pursuant to implementing a
comprehensive water program for Bay-Delta), review granted sub nom. Laub v. Davis, 129 P.3d
320 (Cal. 2006); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 124 Cal. App. 4th 245
(2004) (invalidating SWRCB permits granted to a private water banking scheme); Planning and
Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892 (2000) (vacating certification
of environmental impact report for changes to State Water Project contracts); United States v.
State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986) (partially rejecting the SWRCB's Bay-
Delta water quality standards). For a partial sampling of cases addressing the Bay-Delta's
tributary rivers, see California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (Stanislaus River); Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (San Joaquin River); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.
725 (1950) (San Joaquin River); Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853
(9th Cir. 2004) (Trinity and Sacramento Rivers); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 1998) (San Joaquin River), remanded sub nomn.Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18
F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (Yuba River), noted in LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 6
(describing Woodmuffas "the nation's first environmental injunction"); Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Rodgers, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (San Joaquin River); Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay
Mun. Utilities Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183 (1980) (Mokelumne River), Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun.
Utilities Dist., 20 Cal. 3d 327 (1977) (Mokelumne River), vacated, 439 U.S. 811 (1978).
. 8 E.g, Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3401-12, 106 Stat.
4600, 4706-731 (1992); California Bay-Delta Authority Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 79400-76 (West
2007). For a summary of earlier statutes authorizing exploitation of the Bay-Delta, see El
Dorado Irrigation District v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 142 Cal. App. 4th 937, 945-49 (2006).
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support of the recent "CALFED" program, which modestly described itself
as "the largest, most comprehensive water management program in the
world."9 On a grand and expensive scale, CALFED devised a set of complex
strategies for allowing increasing water consumption from an estuary where
scarcity is common and variability endemic. Those strategies generated
academic attention, with legal authors gravitating to Bay-Delta controversies
like evolutionary biologists to the Galapagos." Almost without exception,
their scholarship has described CALFED's innovations as models of creative
pragmatism."
But those innovations have not succeeded. 2  Despite many
advantages-regulatory creativity and cooperation, sometimes substantial
funding, attention from high-level officials, and an impressive confluence of
government and private expertise-the federal-state programs designed to
redress the Bay-Delta's resource conflicts have so far produced a fiasco.
9 CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 1. The ROD adds that CALFED is
an unprecedented effort to build a framework for managing California's most precious
natural resource: water.., the most complex and extensive ecosystem restoration
project ever proposed.., one of the most intensive water conservation efforts ever
attempted... the most far-reaching effort to improve the drinking water quality of
millions of Californians as well as an unprecedented commitment to watershed
restoration ... and.., the most significant investment in storage and conveyance in
decades.
Id; see also Jody Freeman & Daniel A- Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE LJ.
795, 796 (2005) (describing Bay-Delta regulatory structures as positive examples of regulatory
innovation); Barton H. Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
261, 307-09 (2000) [hereinafter Thompson, Markets for Nature] (describing the "Environmental
Water Account" approach used by the CALFED program).
10 See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAx ET AL, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 554-65 (3rd ed.
2000); Robert W. Adler & Michele Straube, Watersheds and the Integration of US. Water Law
and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 37-45 (2000);
Alf W. Brandt, An Environmental Water Account: The California Experience, 5 U. DEWe. WATER
L. REV. 426, 427 (2002); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy
in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2005); Freeman & Farber,
supra note 9; Robert Jerome Glennon & John E. Thorson, Federal Environmental Restoration
Initiatives: An Analysis of Agency Performance and the Capacity for Change, 42 ARIz. L. REV.
483, 516-21 (2000); Michael Graf, Using The Public Trust Doctrine To Achieve Proportionate
Reductions of Water Diversions rom The Delta, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POL'Y 263 (1995);
Elizabeth A. Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
341 (1996); Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodversitv. A Critical Comparison of
Legal Tools forAugmentingStreamflows in California, 15 STAN. EN TI L.J. 3 (1996); Thompson,
Markets for Nature, supra note 9; Patrick Wright, Fixing the Delta- the CALFED Bay-Delta
Program and Water Policy Under the Davis Administration, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 331
(2001). Historians and other non-legal authors have written on this topic as well. See, e.g.,
NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST 407-25 (revised ed. 2001); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DESERT (revised ed. 1993) (analyzing the politics of western water development, with extended
attention to the Central Valley's controversies); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE (1985)
(analyzing water use politics throughout the west, and particularly in the Central Valley).
I1 Eg., Freeman & Farber, supra note 9; Thompson, Markets for Nature, supra note 9, at
308-09, 312-15; Brandt, supra note 10; Rieke, supra note 10.
12 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 14 ("The current Delta is unsustainable for
almost all stakeholders.").
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Some efforts show preliminary signs of progress, 3 but within just a few
years of implementation, key environmental parameters took significant
turns for the worse. 4 Already-suffering fisheries suffered "dramatic
declines;"' new species were listed under the federal Endangered Species
Act; the Bay-Delta's levees remained dangerously prone to collapse; 16 and by
2005, just five years after the CALFED agencies approved their long-term
program, the Bay-Delta's ecological health by some measurements appeared
worse than ever before-notwithstanding benign weather. 7  As one
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) scientist then stated, "[s]omething
is really, really wrong. It is not just the sensitive fish. The cockroaches are
dying off.""8 By 2007, the situation was even worse. Annual fish counts
revealed steep declines from even the 2005 record lows, and biologists
described conditions as "'very bad ... quite a step down from what was
alarmingly bad from previous' surveys."' 9 To avoid total extermination,
California's State Water Project, which supplies most of the state's people
with at least some of their water, briefly shut down its pumps, and then
resumed only at levels far below normal.20 Then, in late summer, a federal
judge ordered another major cutback, which water suppliers estimated
13 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 861-62 (discussing improved salmon runs and
successful groundwater storage and reuse projects); CAL. DEP'T OF FINANCE, IMPLEMENTATION
STATUS OF THE CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, YEARS 1 THROUGH 5, at 92 (2005).
14 See THE BAY INST., ECOLOGICAL SCORECARD: SAN FRANCISCO BAY INDEX 2005, at 4 (2005),
available at http://www.bay.org/Scorecard/2005.Bay.Index.Repor.pdf.
15 LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 33.
16 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 47-51. That problem is less central to this
Article's analysis than the recent ecological crashes, but it is perhaps the most ominous
challenge confronting the Bay-Delta's managers, with the potential not only for ecological and
water supply disruption but also for significant loss of human life if flooding occurs in settled
areas.
17 See Threatened Status for Southern Distinct Population Segment of North American
Green Sturgeon, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,757, 17,758 (Apr. 7, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223)
(describing declines in fish populations "to the lowest levels ever recorded"); Mike Taugher,
Environmental Sirens in Delta Are Screamng, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 1, 2005, at Al
[hereinafter Taugher, Environmental Sirens] (quoting EPA biologist Bruce Herbold); Cal. Dep't
Res., Chronological Reconstructed Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley Water Year Hydrologic
Classification Indices, http://cdec.water.ca.gov/cgi-progs/iodir/WSIHIST [hereinafter Hydrologic
Classification Indices] (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (showing water year classifications dating
back to 1901).
18 SeeTaugher, Environmental Sirens, supranote 17.
19 Mike Taugher, Delta Smelt Force Emergency Action at Water Pumps, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, May 24, 2007 [hereinafter Taugher, Delta Smelt] (quoting EPA biologist Bruce Herbold).
See Matt Weiser, Delta's Pumping Volume to Increase, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 13, 2007, at A4,
available at http'//www.sacbee.comVlll/story/219532.html (quoting University of California,
Davis biologist Bill Bennett, who described the smelt as "closer to extinction than they've ever
been").
20 Juliana Barbassa, State Halts Key Water Pump to Protect Endangered Delta Smelt THE
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 31, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/
news/state/20070531-1803-ca-troubleddelta.htnl; Janet Pelletier, Zone 7 Tapping Into
Emergency Reserves, PLEASANTON WKLY., June 8, 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.pleasantonweekly.com/morguepdf/2007/2007_06_08.pls.sectionl.pdf (explaining
voluntary shutdown by the California Department of Water Resources to protect the Delta
smelt).
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would reduce deliveries by a million acre-feet per year or more.2 One
lobbyist for water supply agencies described it as "the single largest court-
ordered redirection of water in state history. "
22
Those ecological declines coincided with an institutional collapse.23 The
CALFED bureaucratic structure, though praised by legal scholars, was
selectively ignored by key participants in the Bay-Delta controversies;2
received withering critique from independent reviewers and legislators; 25
and struggled to obtain anticipated levels of funding.26 The Bay-Delta
Authority, the joint federal-state agency created to coordinate CALFED's
implementation, fairly quickly saw its relevance evaporate.2 ' The judiciary
began filling the void. Along with the record low smelt counts, the
immediate triggers for the first 2007 pump shutdown were two court orders
that undermined the California Department of Water Resources' (DWR)
pretensions of compliance with the California Endangered Species Act; the
second set of limits came directly from a court order.2" By 2007, CALFED
was a widely-acknowledged failure, and stakeholders on all sides seemed to
agree only that the present management approach must be replaced by
something dramatically different.29
Yet many of the key conflicts that originally necessitated CALFED
persist. California's water wants continue to grow; even as the crisis
escalated, the federal and state agencies responsible for delivering Bay-Delta
water proposed to increase pumping levels.30 Such export pumping
contributed to both historic and recent ecological declines,3" and if those
21 Mike Taugher, Judge: Cut Water to Help Endangered Fish, OAKLAND TRIB., Sept. 2, 2007.
22 Id. (quoting Tim Quinn of the Association of California Water Agencies).
23 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 1.
24 See, e.g, LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 80.
25 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 872-73; Letter from the Little Hoover Comm'n to
Governor Schwarzenegger and members of the Legislature (Nov. 17, 2005), in LIrrrLE HOOVER
COMM'N, supra note 5 ("To a new generation of officials, CALFED is costly, underperforming,
unfocused and unaccountable."). See generally KPMG LLP, CALFED INTERVIEW AND SURVEY
FINDINGS REPORT (2005) (finding widespread dissatisfaction).
26 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 873-75 ("It was extremely fortunate that the
CalFed ROD was adopted at a time when both the state and federal budget surpluses were at an
all-time high."); LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 41 (describing the California Bay-Delta
Authority funding plan as a "failure").
27 Mike Taugher, CALFED Reorganization Includes New Delta Plan, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
July 3, 2006 [hereinafter Taugher, CALFED Reorganization]; see LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra
note 5, at 41 (describing "the ambiguity of [CALFED's] mission, the lack of legislative and
executive leadership and waning stakeholder support").
28 See Barbassa, supra note 20 (describing state court litigation); Natural Res. Def. Council
v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-CV-01207, slip op. at 57-58 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2007) (rejecting federal
biological opinions, upon which the California Department of Water Resources had attempted
to partially base its state-law compliance); Taugher, supra note 21 (describing the pumping
reductions subsequently ordered in the Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne litigation).
29 See KPMG LLP, supra note 25, at 14; LrrrE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at v-xi.
30 See, e.g., Glen Martin, The California Water Wars: Water Mowing to Fans, Not lish;
Environmentalists Lose Leverage as Agnbusiness Locks in Cheap, Plentiful Supples-for
Decades, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 2005, at A15.
31 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 124 ("Recent work on [the] pelagic organism
decline indicates that Delta pumping may play a significant role in the decline of delta smelt.").
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
declines are not reversed soon, the CALFED agencies could lose species or
leave the hub of California's water supply system an injunction away from
another major shutdown, this one perhaps of more lasting duration-exactly
the outcomes the CALFED process attempted to prevent. In 2005,
California's Little Hoover Commission summarized the situation bluntly:
"CALFED was forged from a crisis, and to a crisis CALFED has returned. 32
In 2007, commenting on the pump shutdown, DWR's director was similarly
pessimistic: "If we don't fix the delta, this is going to start happening every
year."33
These setbacks raise important questions about the ways we attempt to
understand and resolve environmental crises, for CALFED initially seemed a
model response to a classic environmental challenge. From the Columbia
River to the Okavango Delta, water managers wrestle with similar dilemmas
as they attempt to sustain ecosystems while allocating scarce water to meet
growing human needs.' Other natural resources present analogous
challenges; whether they are managing energy supplies,35 ocean fisheries,
36
or forests,37 to provide just a few examples, environmental decision-makers
often must balance protection and consumption of scarce and variable
resources. These challenges are likely to become increasingly common, as
growing populations and developing economies place increased demand
upon many resources, and as climate change exacerbates the instability of
natural systems.' If the CALFED agencies, though blessed with access to
32 Letter from the Little Hoover Comm'n to Governor Schwarzenegger and members of the
Legislature (Nov. 17, 2005), in LITrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5. The CALFED ROD has
been challenged and is currently being reviewed by the California Supreme Court. Cites to the
"CALFED Administrative Record" refer to the record from that litigation.
33 Barbassa, supra note 20 (quoting Lester Snow).
34 See, e.g., FRED PEARCE, WHEN THE RIVERS RUN DRY: WATER-THE DEFINING CRISIS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 70 (2006) (describing water problems throughout the world); MARQ DE
VILLIERS, WATER: THE FATE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE 3-9 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2000)
(1999) (describing conflicting demands placed on Botswana's Okavango Delta); SANDRA POSTEL,
THE LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY (1992) (describing water conflicts worldwide); Reed
Benson, "The Supreme Court of Science" Speaks on Water Rights- National Academy of
Sciences Columbia River Report and its Water Policy Implications 35 ENVTL L. 85, 86-87
(2005). See generally Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish that Roared: The Endangered Species
Act, State Groundwater Law, and Private Property Rights Collide over the Texas Edwards
Aquifer, 28 ENvTL. L 845 (1998) (discussing management of the Edwards Aquifer in Texas).
35 See Craig Canine, California illuminates the World, ONEARrH, Spring 2006, available at
http://www.nrdc.org/onearth/06spr/cal.asp (describing the California energy crisis).
36 See, e.g., Jeff Brax, Zoning the Oceans- Using the National Marine Sanctuaries Act and the
Antiquities Act to Establish Marine Protection Areas and Marine Reserves in America, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 71, 94-97 (2002) (describing the demise of many fisheries).
37 See generally, YAFFEE, supra note 1 (describing logging controversies in the Pacific
Northwest); Dave Owen, Prescriptive Laws, Uncertain Science, and Political Stories: Forest
Management in the Sierra Nevada, 29 ECOLOGY LQ. 747 (2003) (describing Forest Service
efforts to balance environmental protection, the amount of timber harvests, and the reliability
of those harvests).
38 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE CENT., OUR CHANGING CLIMATE: ASSESSING THE
RISKS TO CALIFORNA 2 (2006), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-500-
2006-077/CEC-500-2006-077.PDF [hereinafter OUR CHANGING CLIMATE]; INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
1152 [Vol. 37:1145
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"enormous intellectual talent,"39 a political consensus demanding solutions,
and the creativity to develop new management techniques, struggled to
resolve their high-profile problem, the obvious and important questions are
what went wrong,4" and how could decision makers lacking such advantages
hope to do better?4'
As in any environmental crisis, the answers to those questions are
complex and multifaceted, and several recent studies have explored aspects
of CALFED's troubles.4 The reports have identified flaws in CALFED's
institutional structure, which left communication and accountability lines
unclear; weak funding mechanisms that failed to produce anticipated
money; leadership voids at the state and particularly federal levels;43 and
failures of adaptive management as key sources of trouble. The Public
Policy Institute of California (PPIC) analyzed the Bay-Delta's full array of
problems from the perspective of scientists, economists, and engineers; its
authors attribute the Bay-Delta's ecological declines largely to attempts to
impose stability upon a naturally fluctuating ecosystem.
44
All of those critiques are cogent and important,45 but this Article argues
that they leave out something crucial. 4  CALFED's institutional
arrangements, though flawed in many ways, still were better than those
often utilized in environmental management, 47 and even when stakeholders
thought CALFED's institutional arrangements were working well,4
VULNERABILITY 79, 83-84 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007), available athttp://www.ipcc-wg2.org/.
39 Glennon & Thorson, supra note 10, at 520.
40 To critique the CALFED process is not to condemn it, for that process tackled problems
no one previously had been able to solve, and that many entities had shown little interest in
solving. See LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at ii.
41 See Freeman & Farber, supna note 9, at 857 (attributing CALFED's successes partly to "a
favorable stakeholder environment in which parties not only wanted agreement, but had the
expertise, resources, and relationships necessary to contribute to it").
42 See generally LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supm note 5; KPMG LLP, supra note 25; Letter from
Michael Genest, Cal. Dep't of Finance, to Michael Chrisman (Jan. 27, 2006), in IMPLEMENTATION
STATUS OF THE CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, YEARS 1 THROUGH 5, supra note 13.
43 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 40-41.
44 Id at 157-58. Historically, the Bay-Delta system was spatially and temporally
heterogeneous, with salinity conditions varying with seasons and tides. Most of its native
species co-evolved with that regime. But because of the need of both in-Delta and export water
users for freshwater, the Delta now is managed to provide a stable freshwater system, and this
stability favors invasive species that have altered food chains upon which native species
depend. See id at 71-73.
45 Despite agreeing with those critiques, I concur with Freeman and Farber's core argument
that the CALFED process generated exemplary innovations and improved upon prior modes of
Bay-Delta management. See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9.
46 This Article also supplements those analyses by providing a detailed legal discussion.
47 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 839-40 (explaining the fragmented, piecemeal
decision-making and federal-state tensions that CALFED partially succeeded in overcoming);
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1, 8-14 (2003) (describing several "confused regulatory terrains").
48 Those foundations also were laid while Democrats controlled the federal and state
executive branches. While hardly anything positive can be said about implementation under
Republican administrations, a simple blame-the-Republicans diagnosis leaves out an important
part of the story.
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management decisions were laying the foundations for future troubles.49 The
PPIC report identifies weaknesses in the physical arrangement and
management of Bay-Delta infrastructure and takes huge steps toward
envisioning fixes, but the key solution it proposes-allowing more
hydrologic variability-could take years, complex engineering, lots of
money, and intense political wrangling to implement,o and is less likely to
ever succeed if implemented without regard to the tensions discussed in this
Article.5' While funding may have been short of CALFED's managers'
expectations, the program still has received far more government money
than typically is available for resolving environmental problems.52
Attributing CALFED's struggles to institutional shortcomings, leadership
failures, paltry legislative allocations, and attempts to impose stability upon
a naturally-variable ecosystem therefore suggests a vain search for levels of
institutional achievement far beyond what normally is attainable, and those
analyses provide only partial answers.
This Article adds to those reports, and to prior legal analyses of the
CALFED process, by explaining that the Bay-Delta's resource allocation
crises are also partially rooted in a basic conceptual model for
understanding environmental crises-a model that, while often employed, is
ill-suited for a world of environmental variability and institutional fallibility.
That conceptual model posits that environmental laws and policies exist to
promote and balance two things: consumption and protection. We debate,
for example, how much water each user should be allowed to pump from
our rivers and how much must remain to satisfy the needs of fishy3 and we
seek a permanent and stable allocation among those ends. Moreover, in
accordance with common political and judicial concerns about over-
regulation,5' environmental managers routinely assume that all resources
not necessary for legally-required environmental protection should or even
must be available for consumption, and legal schemes often both
incorporate and encourage that assumption.55 Those managers frequently
49 See infra Part IV.
50 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 179 ("politically, our analysis is purposefully
naive").
51 One of the two promising solutions identified by the PPIC-reducing both the amount
and reliability of pumping-is facially irreconcilable with such trends. The other-developing
infrastructure to move water around, rather than through, the Delta-might somewhat
reconcile tensions among pumping, protection, and reliability, though it will take years to build
and is still likely to create environmental strains and the commensurate threat of unexpected
outcomes, particularly if pumping volumes grow.
52 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 88-89, 187.
53 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PrefaCe to WATER USE CONFLICT IN THE WEST:
IMPLICATIONS OF REFORMING THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION'S WATER SUPPLY POLICIES (1997),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/Oxx/doc46/wateruse.pdf ("Environmentalists, who want
water to be left in the rivers to preserve threatened species, are now competing with urban and
agricultural users for the West's limited water resources.").
54 See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 42-43 (describing theories of overregulation and
jurisprudence designed to combat the perceived pervasiveness of regulatory excess).
55 E.g., Bennett V. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997) (describing the Endangered Species
Act as a statute that attempts to protect species yet prevent "needless economic dislocation").
1154 [Vol. 37:1145
LA W, ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMISM, RELIABILITY
believe their job is to determine exactly where the brink of legal non-
compliance lies, and to.allow, or even encourage, consumption right up to
the perceived edge. Hence, for example, the CALFED agencies determined,
in the record of decision that defined their program, that even though they
were legally obligated to improve environmental conditions, they also would
attempt to provide more water for consumption and would leave less
surplus water in the system.56 Encouraged by a legal system prioritizing
consumption yet demanding baseline levels of protection, and by
conventional expectations that they should constrain consumption as little
as possible, they perceived no other choice.5 7
The flaw in that conceptual framework is its misapprehension of the
implications of environmental uncertainty, and its consequent tendency to
encourage fragile, unreliable resource allocation patterns. Environmental
conditions often vary chaotically, with changes, surprises, and occasional
catastrophic events the norm. The rules apportioning scarce resources
therefore rarely can set just one permanent balance between consumptive
uses and protection requirements, and we cannot assume we may safely
consume right up to some fixed and discernable brink of illegality. Instead,
resource management rules should anticipate the burdens of uncertainty,
managerial fallibility, and change. When dry weather leaves rivers low, for
example, rules determine who gets the remaining water and whether the
river is pumped dry, and when conditions are wet, managers must determine
whether we leave a buffer for drought, or whether we instead allow habitual
consumption beyond dry-year limits.58 Likewise, if we misunderstand a
natural system, and protected species' survival requires more water than we
had anticipated, either our consumptive patterns or our protective goals
Environmental management provides numerous examples of attempts to walk tightropes
between over- and under-regulation. Air quality managers, for example, often attempt to
regulate only to the minimum extent necessary to ensure compliance with the federal Clean Air
Act's National Ambient Air Quality Standards (and believe they have no choice to go further),
without preserving some margin for error. See, e.g., James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy
v. Democracy Conflicts Between Modeling and Participation and Environmental Law and
Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 959 & n.302 (2005). Environmental managers commonly attempt
to determine the minimum amount of habitat necessary to allow endangered species to recover,
with the assumption that development up to those limits will be allowed. See, e.g., Tony Davis,
San Diego's Habitat Triage, HiGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.PrintableArticle?articleid=14355 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
Water managers are commonly torn between policies promoting environmental protection and
others understood as maximizing consumptive use. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (promoting both
goals).
56 See CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 41.
57 See CALFED, BAY-DELTA PROGRAM FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, at. CR-30 (2000), available at
http://www.calwater.ca.gov/calfed/library/library_archiveEIS.html [hereinafter CALFED EIR]
(rejecting export reductions as an alternative worth considering).
58 Of course, law doesn't always determine outcomes, and gaps often exist between rules
and practice. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Non-Compliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 297, 297-99 (1999); Reed D.
Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in the Pacific
Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENvTL. L. 881, 881 (1998).
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must adjust. But the traditional consumption vs. protection, consume-to-the-
brink conceptual framework says little about preparing for such variability.59
Moreover, adaptive policies, though often emphasized in academic and
policy literature as a means to address variability and uncertainty, can prove
dauntingly difficult to implement, largely because common preferences for
stability can undermine the institutional dexterity upon which adaptive
management approaches depend. 60 The common consequence is fragile
solutions ill-suited for a variable world.
Rather than focusing only on traditionally understood conflicts between
consumption and protection, this Article proposes an improved conceptual
framework that integrates environmental variability and uncertainty, and
that directly addresses the relationship between that variability and the
reliability-that is, the consistency and predictability-of resource
allocations.6' It acknowledges that in contexts of scarcity and environmental
dynamism, protection, consumption, and reliability are often in tension,62
with reliability increased only at the expense of protection or consumption.
It also acknowledges that ignoring those tensions, and trying to maximize all
competing goals simultaneously, can leave resource management schemes
dangerously prone to costly and damaging legal collapses.6 Consequently,
solutions like those devised by the CALFED agencies, which are designed to
increase consumption and protection of already-scarce resources, all in
political environments where reliability is of paramount importance, will
depend upon luck, managerial dexterity, brilliant engineering, and ample
funding. Absent such good fortune, and even sometimes with it, such
solutions will prove fragile, even if, like CALFED, they are implemented by
talented and dedicated people, and thus all of the latest and best
governmental innovations will be for naught, for reliability requires margins
for error.
59 See, e.g., in/in Part mH.C (describing the structure of California water law). The
Endangered Species Act, for example, imposes stringent protections when species are listed
and no protections at all until listing occurs. See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress?An Agenda for
Administrative Reform of the Endangered Species Ac4 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 368, 384-85 (1998).
Similarly, the Clean Air Act's air quality planning provisions contain little guidance on
addressing uncertainty and variability; they seem to assume that modeling for a plan will either
demonstrate compliance, in which case the plan is acceptable, or will not, in which case the
plan -must be rejected, with little acknowledgment that modeling can only offer probabilistic
predictions. See Fine & Owen, supra note 55, at 933-34, 972 "n.373.
60 See Doremus, supra note 3, at 55; c£ Freeman & Farber, supm note 9, at 837 ("conditions
of radical uncertainty... call for a spirit of provisionalism").
61 See supra note 4 (explaining this Article's definition of reliability).
62 This is not always true, of course. See inf/i notes 106-112 and accompanying text. My
more limited thesis is that this conceptual framework is applicable often enough to be more
useful than conventional conceptualizations.
63 By legal collapse, I mean a management scheme that must be scrapped because it proves
incapable of achieving the substantive mandates of applicable laws. The failure of forest
management in the Pacific Northwest provides an example; though timber harvesting continued
for years despite environmental degradation, the judicial injunctions eventually began to slam
close the gap between legal mandates and actual practice.
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This Article's analysis proceeds as follows. Part II discusses traditional
theories-the "capture" paradigm and the "tragedy of the commons"-that
underlie our resource management laws and often provide our conceptual
foundations for understanding environmental problems, and that, in
combination with traditional misconceptions of environmental stability,
encourage us to understate or ignore the unreliability inherent in many
resource allocation systems. It then develops an improved conceptual
framework incorporating the role of environmental dynamism and change.
Parts III and IV turn from general theory to the Bay-Delta's story, using those
conflicts to 'illustrate the importance of the conceptual shift described in
Part II. Part III discusses how environmental conditions, engineered
infrastructure, and legal systems have created deep tensions among
consumption, protection, and reliability, and have encouraged the adoption
of solutions ill-suited to survive environmental change. Part IV discusses
how those tensions came to a head during the Bay-Delta crisis, and how
resource managers attempted to resolve them.
This discussion does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the
CALFED process. It focuses on aspects, albeit key ones, of CALFED's
troubles. This Article also does not claim that poor results resulted solely
from conceptual mis-framings, or that those results can be attributed to any
single cause.61 But this Article does explain how conceptual frameworks
helped increase CALFED's vulnerability to failure, and Part V therefore
closes the article by returning to the alternative conceptual framework
proposed in Part II, and describing how it can inform improved resolutions
of resource conflicts in the Bay-Delta and elsewhere.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS AND DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS
A. Traditional Paradigms
A good starting point for understanding the challenges facing managers
of many shared natural resources, and for explaining some of the legal roots
of the Bay-Delta's crises, is the traditional set of conceptual frameworks
often used to understand resource allocation.
One traditional framework derives from what some scholars label the
"capture"65 or "dominion"66 paradigm. This framework defines resource
consumption as a good to be rewarded and a measure of economic health; if
it acknowledges limits at all, it generally assumes that economic signals and
rational self-interest will facilitate responses to shortage without regulatory
64 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 137-38 (arguing that no single solution has yet
been identified for the Bay-Delta's ills).
65 See Michael C. Blummn & Lucas Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL L. 673, 684-90 (2005).
66 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y F. 1,
5-6(1996).
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intervention.67 Though now often criticized as an anachronism from an era
when human populations were low and natural bounty seemed unlimited,68
influential vestiges of that paradigm remain throughout our legal systems for
environmental management,69 and those vestiges tend to be bolstered by a
political and academic climate overtly hostile to any "over-regulation" that
might interfere with consumptive patterns.70 Some resources remain
purposefully unregulated, many rules subsidize or otherwise encourage
consumption even of scarce resources,71 and many resource users, even
while acknowledging in theory that limits might exist, are loathe to admit
they might be approached.72  Despite the critiques of environmental
economists, we still often determine the strength of our economy partially
by measuring resources consumed.73 Similarly, resource users routinely
resist consumptive limits, and that resistance often succeeds, at least
temporarily.74
Almost forty years ago, biologist Garret Hardin wrote the classic
critique of the capture paradigm.75 He observed that exploitation of an open-
access resource-a resource open to many but controlled by none-creates
a tendency toward tragedy. 76 Each user's most "rational" strategy is to take
as much as possible, even if the collective effect of many individuals
pursuing that strategy is exhaustion of the resource. 77 Individual restraint
67 See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 680-81 (2003)
(criticizing "a preanalytic worldview in which nature is assumed to be boundless"); John G.
Sprankling, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in American Prope ty Law, 63 U. CH. L. REV. 519, 520-21
(1996).
68 E.g., Blumin & Ritchie, supra note 65, at 686-92; Kysar, supra note 67; Wiener, supra note
66, at 10 ("it represents an ethic of hubris, disdain, and despotism").
69 See Kysar, supra note 67, at 678 (arguing that the continued vitality of this paradigm helps
explain the lack of urgency with which we approach many environmental problems).
70 See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 8-14 (describing the political and academic climate);
Richard W. Parker, Grading the Governmen4 70 U. Cu]. L. REV. 1345, 1345-55 (2003)
(questioning the basis for this culture).
71 E.g., Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing
water subsidies); Harry Scheiber, Ocean Goverance and the Marine Fisheries Crlsis: Two
Decades of Innovation, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 121 (2001) (noting that fishery exploitation was
encouraged by government subsidies); Michael Axline, Salvage Logging: Point & Counterpoint:
Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL. L. 613, 619-20 (1996) (discussing timber
harvest subsidies); Joseph L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater A Morsel of California Legal
History 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269, 270-73 (2003).
72 See, e.g., infra Part IiI.C (describing state and federal laws allocating California's waters).
Such reluctance to acknowledge limits forms a recurring theme throughout environmental
management, and seems particularly pronounced when the resource at stake is water. See, e.g.,
Barton H. Thompson, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL.
L. 241, 255 (2000) [hereinafter Thompson, Tragically Difficult]; WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE
BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS, at xv-xix (1992) (castigating the water booster
culture of the American west).
73 See Kysar, supra note 67, at 680-81.
74 See, e.g., Thompson, Tragically Difficult, supra note 72, at 243 (analyzing why such
resistance occurs).
75 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
76 Id; see Kysar, supra note 67, at 682-83 (describing the significance of Hardin's insight).
77 Hardin, supra note 75, at 1244; see ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 2-3 (James
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would be pointless, for resources saved through conservation would only be
consumed by someone else.78 The implications of Hardin's insight were
profound-it undermined paradigms that treat resource consumption as an
inherent good, and posited that only the intervention of regulatory schemes
can prevent tragic outcomes.
The power of Hardin's metaphor 79 derives not only from its simplicity,
but also from its relevance to the modem world. Many natural resource
dilemmas involve some variation of the tragedy of the commons.8 " Water
bodies, for example, are easy to exploit and difficult to control.8 ' Fisheries, 2
timber harvesting,83 and even-air pollutions' pose similar challenges. Hardin
pointed out several of these examples, other scholars have discussed many
more (and have refined his search for solutions), 5 and the commons has
become a classic conceptual model for understanding and evaluating legal
and policy regimes for resource management.88
E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990). People do not always behave this way. As numerous
commentators have pointed out, people recycle, vote, avoid littering, contribute to charities,
and even volunteer for dangerous military duties despite seemingly reaping only a tiny share of
the benefits of their efforts. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232,
1247 (2001); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
RationalityAssumption from LawandEconomics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1138-42 (2000).
78 Hardin, supra note 75, at 1246 (discussing the "pathogenic effects of conscience"). This
problem is closely related to collective action problems identified by Mancur Olson, Jr. and
others; because each commons user would gain disproportionately little benefit from his own
restraint, his incentive is to act as a free rider. See MANCuR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION 2 (1965); Carlson, supra note 77, at 1243-44.
79 Hardin did not create the idea of the tragedy of the conmons. Instead, he presented it in a
compelling fashion, gave it a pithy name, and cogently explained such tragedies' frequency. See
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property hResource: the Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124, 135 (1954); OSTROM, supra note 77 (tracing the historic evolution of the idea, and
quoting Aristotle and Hobbes).
80 See Hardin, supra note 75, at 1245 (discussing rangeland grazing, fisheries management,
urban parking, and population growth).
81 Id.
82 1d.; see Thompson, Tragically Difficult supra note 72, at 247-49; Harry N. Scheiber &
Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to Privatization: International Law, Biology,
and Economics in the Marine Fisheries Debates, 1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 10, 17-18
(1998) ("A map of the world's ocean fishery stocks today illustrates a shocking number of areas
in which stocks are seriously endangered or actually depleted."); J.R. McNEILL, SOMETHING NEW
UNDER THE SUN 237-52 (2000) (chronicling declining fisheries and whale populations); Carol M.
Rose, Scientific innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32
ENVTL. L. 755, 760-61 (2002) (describing mechanisms that can lead to a fishery's demise).
83 McNEILL, supra note 82, at 229-37 (describing worldwide disappearance of forests).
84 See Hardin, supra note 75, at 1245; e.g., Thompson, Tragically Difficult, supra note 72, at
253-55 (discussing CO, emissions and global climate change); Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Ain
Four Propositions About Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 103, 107 (1999) (discussing government regulation of air pollution).
85 See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 77, at 58-178 (1990) (discussing community forests and
farmlands, inshore fisheries, surface-water allocation systems, and groundwater allocation
systems); Carlson, supra note 77, at 1234 (discussing recycling); Cole, supra note 84, at 112-17
(discussing acid rain); Thompson, Tragically Difficul; supra note 72, at 246 (discussing
fisheries, groundwater extraction, and climate change). For a summary discussion of later
refinements of the commons concept, see Buzbee, supra note 47, at 7-22.
86 See Brady v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 416 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Commons-management problems often are even more difficult than
Hardin's essay might suggest, for many natural resources serve multiple and
competing purposes. Hardin's primary example-a pasture where herdsman
graze their cattle-implies single-purpose management; he did not discuss
whether some grass might need to be reserved for the pleasure of
picnickers." Yet many resources are not amenable to such single purpose
management. Rivers, for example, often support irrigation, hydropower,
cities, fisheries, and recreation.'a National forests cannot be managed solely
for timber production; they also provide wildlife habitat, sustain water
quality, and allow people to enjoy the woods. 9 Consequently, the challenges
of managing common-access resources typically are multifaceted, with
environmental values, consumptive uses, and non-consumptive uses all
threatened with tragic outcomes.
In practice, the conceptual foundations for many natural resource
regulatory systems derive from an uneasy and shifting balance between the
multifaceted tragedy-of-the-commons theory and the traditional
capture/anti-overregulation paradigm. Regulators typically rely upon legal
environmental quality standards to mark the points at which tragedies of the
commons are occurring, and are charged with taking sufficient action to
avoid compromising backstop environmental protection requirements, even
if those actions limit consumptive use. But, based on the belief that resource
exploitation should not be limited unnecessarily-in other words, that
government should regulate just enough to prevent illegal degradation, but
no more-we often discourage anything that might be termed
overregulation,9" subsidize consumption,9 and ask environmental managers
to find exactly the balance point at which environmental protection
requirements are met and human use is limited no more than necessary,
assuming that such balance points can be readily discerned and that our
consumption patterns will be stable so long as we stop just shy of the
concurring) ("Two generations have now grown up with Garrett Hardin's famous article, The
Tragedy of the Commons."). Many studies also discuss successful management efforts. Eg.,
OSTROM, supra note 77, at 58-101; JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR
SUCCEED 277-308, 329-57 (2005); NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., IMPLEMENTING THE
SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES ACT: ACHIEVEMENTS FROM 1996 TO THE PRESENT 2-6 (2003), available at
http://www.nnifs.noaagov/sfa/SFA-Report-FINAL7-1.pdf.
87 Many of the resources described in Ostrom's studies-waters used exclusively for
agriculture, in-shore fisheries, and southern California aquifers-were also managed for single
purposes. See OSTROM, supra note 77, at 58-178.
88 See, e.g., inf Part If (discussing multiple purposes served by California's rivers).
89 See Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000) ("It is the policy of
the Congress that the national forests are established and shall be administered for outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.").
90 Eg., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 176-77 (1997) (describing the ESA as partly designed
to prevent overregulation). The California Constitution exemplifies this approach, mandating
that water be used as much as possible-a mandate some users interpret as requiring diversion
and consumption-but no more than is reasonable. CAL. CONST. art X, § 2.
91 See, e.g., infra Part I.C.2 (describing subsidies for water consumption); see sources
cited in supra note 71.
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brink.92 These balance points are often contested, with environmental
advocates and resource consumers vigorously disputing where the brink
lies, but far less often do we debate the wisdom or legality of consuming to
that perceived brink. We seek, in short, to avoid tragedies of the commons
but are often willing to fully allocate resources, and often strive to consume
right up to the limits of the law.
B. Environmental Dynamism, Shared Resources, and a New Conceptual
Approach
That standard conceptual framework predicts that resource managers
face a daunting task, for they must resolve multifaceted tensions among
consumers, and between consumption and protection. In practice, however,
another dimension adds additional difficulty: resource managers also must
address environmental dynamism and change.
Though notions of natural harmony, equilibrium, and, as naturalist
George Perkins Marsh once stated, "almost unchanging permanence of
form" once were standard among ecologists and still remain widespread
among non-scientists-and although those views were still widely accepted
when most of our major environmental laws were drafted-environmental
scientists have long since discovered that many natural systems are neither
stable nor predictable.93 The available amounts of many resources fluctuate
chaotically. Weather varies and climates change, even without
anthropogenic influences, and Katrina-like catastrophes, though infrequent,
are not anomalous.9 Throughout much of the world, droughts and floods are
the norm rather than the exception. Species migrate, often with human
assistance, and invade new territories, sometimes with major
consequences.9 5 Even absent human influence, wildlife populations can vary
wildly, and slight alterations to an ecosystem can trigger major changes in
abundance.96 Many ecosystems, including the Bay-Delta, depend upon
change, and struggle to survive without some natural variability.
97
92 E.g, Fine & Owen, supra note 55, at 959 n.302.
93 See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 54 (1990) (quoting GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (D. Lowenthal ed.,
Harvard University Press 1967) (1864)). Botldn discusses ecological research that undermined
traditional understandings of natural harmony and stability. See also Wiener, supra note 66, at
18 (describing this change).
94 BOTEIN, supra note 93, at 56-68 (discussing the historic dynamism of climate and
corresponding ecosystem changes); DIAMOND, supra note 86, at 12-13 (identifying climate
change as a major factor affecting the resilience of human societies).
95 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Nat'l Invasive Species Info. Ctr., Economic Impacts,
http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/impacts.shtml (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
96 See BOTKIN, supra note 93, at 27-71.
97 See, e.g., ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 156-57 (discussing the desirability of
variation in Bay-Delta flows); Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing and Privatization, 83
TEx. L. REV. 1873, 1877 (2005) ("intermittent floods... scour sediment, nourish habitat, and
impede the encroachment of invasive species"); Owen, supra note 37, at 753-54 (discussing
negative impacts of forest fire suppression).
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Incomplete knowledge exacerbates the effects of natural
unpredictability. 8 To provide one notorious example, Colorado River
allocations for years were premised upon overestimates of flows, and water
supply forecasts for much of the southwest thus were compromised not only
by natural dynamism but also by human mistakes.99 Wildlife species often
are misunderstood, and biologists sometimes have limited knowledge about
how many individuals there are or where they live.100 Similar examples
abound throughout environmental science; with many natural systems, we
do not know what conditions might be normal, or whether or why changes
are occurring. 1 ' Limited knowledge increases the difficulty of predicting
how much of a resource will reliably be available for human use, how
stringent environmental protections must be, and where exactly the brink of
unsustainability lies.
Because of that variability and uncertainty, most schemes for managing
common-access resources cannot just define one permanent balance
between resource consumption and environmental protection. Though our
conventional approaches may demand such balance points, they can be
difficult to find, and are likely to change with time. Our management
schemes instead must select-whether intentionally or inadvertently-the
adjustments to be made when conditions change, and the extent to which
we are prepared for variability. If drought strikes or unexpected
environmental needs occur, for example, rules help decide whether water
will remain in our rivers or lakes, or whether pumping will continue at
environmental expense. 10 2 Similarly, during periods of abundance, or where
environmental limits are not understood, rules help decide whether the
resource will be consumed to the maximum extent possible, creating the
potential for sudden and drastic cutbacks when times change, or whether
consumption limits will reserve a margin of safety. The rigidity of our rules
also influences preparedness; if our rules create de jure or de facto
inflexibility, adjustment to change can be significantly more difficult. And
when catastrophes strike-when natural disasters damage our supply
infrastructure, for example, drought sets in, or protected species'
populations plummet-our schemes for managing consumption and
protection will likely have played important roles in determining whether we
are prepared, or whether we must attempt costly changes in course.
98 See, e.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 889 ("[T]he dearth of knowledge about
virtually every aspect of the Bay-Delta system is striking.").
99 See Robert Jerome Glennon & Peter W. Culp, The Last Green Lagoon: How and Why the
Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 903, 916 (2002).
100 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 37, at 778-79 (describing limited understanding of the
California spotted owl).
101 See, e.g., Mike Taugher, Delta F sh Crash Remains a Mystery, CONTRA COSTA TMES (Dec.
28, 2005), http://www.contracostatimes.comL/specialreport/ei-543763 (last visted Nov. 18,
2007).
102 See generally Rieke, supra note 10 (describing competition over water supplies during
California's 1987-92 drought, and the role environmental laws played in determining allocation
of dry year flows).
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Rather than merely balancing consumption and preservation, resource
managers therefore must often address tri-polar tensions between resource
consumption, environmental protection, and the reliability of resource
allocations. 1 3 The conceptual diagram below graphically depicts this tension.
The bottom left comer represents the amount of a resource devoted to
environmental protection. The top comer represents reliability. The bottom
right comer represents the amount of consumption.10o A management scheme
for allocating a scarce resource may be plotted by placing it closer to the
values it favors and further from those it disfavors."0 5 Moving a management
scheme closer to any one comer, however, necessarily means moving it
further from at least one, if not both, of the others. Maximizing reliability, for
example, can require reducing commitments to both protection and
consumption, and leaving an increased amount of a resource unallocated. The
figure thus reflects the common reality that protection, consumption, and
reliability can be mutually exclusive.
Reliabili
Levels of Allocations
Protection to Consumtion
This diagram obviously is highly schematic. Protection and
consumption are broad terms describing things not always amenable to
103 In contrast, a traditional conceptual model could be represented by a two-dimensional
continuum between consumption and protection, and the task of resource managers would be
simply to find an optimum point along that line.
104 Consumption is not necessarily the same as economic benefit; while resource
consumption is usually beneficial to someone, it often causes negative collateral effects, and
sometimes the aggregate negative consequences of those collateral effects far outweigh the
aggregate benefits. See generaly PEARCE, supra note 34, at 111 (describing the negative side-
effects of many water use schemes).
105 Management schemes for wilderness areas, for example, plot close to the endpoint of
pure environmental protection; preservation is paramount, resource consumption is limited,
and the reliability of consumption is basically irrelevant. See Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b)
(2000) (precluding all but a limited set of uses of wilderness areas). Once a species approaches
extinction, the Endangered Species Act plots similarly. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 173-74 (1978) ("Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of
priorities."). A prior appropriation water-allocation system unfettered by environmental
constraints would plot closer to the lower right corner. Such a legal system prioritizes
consumption, but reliability is of secondary importance for all but the most senior users, and
environmental protection is irrelevant. See discussion ilnfra Part III.C.1 (describing prior
appropriation).
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clear definition, let alone measurement or quantification. Reliability, as
defined in this Article, is a clearer concept, but still is difficult to measure or
predict.'" Additionally, though the diagram might suggest unity among
environmental protections or consumptive uses, tensions commonly exist
within each of the endpoints. Conditions favoring one wildlife species can
harm another, 10 7 and consumptive uses can also conflict. Water users lower
in a river system may share more interests with environmentalists devoted
to preserving in-stream flows, for example, than with upstream
appropriators, and fishermen and irrigators are often at odds.'1s
This conceptual framework also is by no means universally applicable
or fully descriptive of resource management controversies. Its premise-that
reliability, allocations to environmental protection, and resource
consumption are inexorably in tension-is rarely entirely true, and its
applicability can vary over time. Some resources are not that scarce. Others
are, but only some of the time or in some locations, leaving opportunities to
increase consumption without any significant threat of degradation or
unreliability.1"9 Even where such scarcity is persistent, many actions-for
example, introducing technologies that augment resource availability, or
altering the place or method of resource extraction-can simultaneously
improve consumption, protection, and reliability."' Environmental
protection occurs in multiple ways, many of which do not conflict with
resource consumption, and much of the work of environmental managers
focuses on finding such win-win solutions."' Environmental protection also
often creates reliability benefits and can support consumption; without
protection, resources can entirely disappear."2
For all of these reasons, this conceptual approach provides neither a
universal explanation for environmental dilemmas nor an algorithmic tool
capable of spitting out fully-formed solutions. But so long as we respect
these caveats, it can be useful." 3 The tensions it describes are common, at
least where resources are scarce; taking more water from a depleted river or
106 See supra note 4.
107 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 83 ("[I]n the present Delta, the delta smelt and
Chinook salmon have different, and at times opposing, needs.").
108 See generally State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674 (2006) (aligning
environmental groups within Delta agricultural interests).
109 The CALFED ROD, for example, was partly premised on the hopeful assumption that
such conditions existed. See nfa notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
110 For example, desalination might someday allow increased consumption, improved
reliability, and increased environmental protection of California's freshwater resources. See 2
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2005, at 6-3 (2005)
[hereinafter 2005 WATER PLAN] (discussing desalination's benefits and potential problems).
111 See, e.g., ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 171-72 (describing infrastructure changes
that might facilitate consumption and improve environmental performance).
112 See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 65, at 691-92 (describing the demise of the
passenger pigeon); Brax, supra note 36, at 100-02 (observing that marine sanctuaries can boost
fishing by providing refuges from which fish can repopulate surrounding areas).
113 See generallyGudo Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRles, Liability Rules, and
Inalienabilityj One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1128 (1972) (explaining why
conceptual models, despite their perils, are often worth developing).
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more board-feet from a heavily-logged forest, for example, almost
necessarily creates environmental strains, and those strains, by increasing
threats of non-compliance with environmental laws, can threaten the
reliability of consumptive use.1 1 4 Even a generalized conceptual framework
can help environmental decision makers understand and resolve those
tensions. We routinely use simplified paradigms or rely on "pre-analytic
worldviews"-traditional economics' treatment of consumption as an
inherent good, a desire to avoid overregulation, the classic tragedy-of-the-
commons theory, for example-to understand environmental controversies,
evaluate the urgency of problems, and develop solutions, just as in other
legal areas we rely upon simple concepts to organize our understanding of
problems and inform or exclude possible remedies.1 5 Those conceptual
frameworks ought to address tensions between consumption, protection,
and reliability, for the stability of resource allocation patterns tends to be
ecologically, economically, and politically important."6 But many traditional
environmental paradigms address those tensions obliquely, if at all,117 and
thus encourage fixes that prove insufficiently robust or demand rapid
adaptation when environmental conditions change. This conceptual
approach, by contrast, provides an improved basis for evaluating and
explaining whether solutions will be durable or are built only for best-case
scenarios.
And those explanations can be politically and legally important.
Although existing legal frameworks and economic incentives often
encourage policymakers to allow or even promote consumption right up to
perceived brinks of legal non-compliance, rarely do laws mandate such an
approach. 118 Instead, agencies generally possess the legal discretion, though
they may not realize it,"9 to plan for margins of error-so long as they are
able to offer rational explanations for imposing such restraint. Similarly,
while political pressure for consumption may be intense, it is not always
114 See generaly DAVID QUAMMEN, THE SONG OF THE DODO (1996) (describing ecological
research connecting habitat reductions to extinction).
115 See Kysar, supra note 67, at 678 (arguing that flawed conceptual worldviews encourage
us to underestimate the urgency of environmental problems). A classic example of a simplified
organizing principle is the legal concept of "separation of powers." The concept is general, but
we routinely use it to understand constitutional dilemmas and narrow the range of permissible
resolutions. Such general concepts are particularly important to non-expert decision makers
struggling to understand complex problems-a description often applicable to the judges and
political leaders or appointees who oversee environmental management, yet may know little of
environmental science. Without such simplified heuristics, they may not be able to organize the
data, claims, and narratives before them into any sort of coherent understanding.
116 While variability may promote th vitality of healthy ecosystems, it can be devastating to
already-degraded systems. See, e.g, QUAMMEN, supra note 114, at 293-96 (describing how
natural variability and scarcity can combine to cause extinctions).
117 A traditional capture approach, which does not acknowledge limits, obviously also does
not acknowledge the unreliability that follows from exceeding those limits, and an approach
that perceives consumption/protection balance points as determinable and stable also provides
little reason to consider unreliability.
118 See, e.g, infra Part 11.C (describing the legal systems for managing California water).
119 See Fine & Owen, supra note 55, at 959 & n.302 (describing California air quality
regulators' perception that they could not legally impose a margin of safety in their regulations).
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immutable. The importance of long-term reliability is something resource-
consuming businesses can appreciate, 2 ' and agencies generally have
institutional incentives toward developing lasting solutions, for failure can
be professionally embarrassing and personally disappointing.'21 Legal
frameworks also are subject to change, and legislators often can decide
whether to enact or perpetuate laws encouraging scarce resource
consumption. A traditional conceptual model for resource management
provides no argument against such policies or laws; to a judge or resource
consumer believing that environmental limits are fixed and determinable
and that consumption up to those limits poses no threat, or that adaptive
policies can address any unexpected developments that arise, any regulatory
reluctance to allow consumption right up to those limits might seem
capricious. A reliability-based approach, however, provides the theoretical
foundations for environmental managers to develop and justify solutions
that reserve margins of error.
To ground this discussion in practical experience, the next sections
turn from theory to exposition, and discuss ongoing efforts to resolve one of
the nation's most important and intractable resource allocation crises. That
discussion, though by no means comprehensive, is detailed, the CALFED
controversy involves a complex and dynamic ecosystem, rich history,
convoluted politics, and an intricate and somewhat conflicting web of laws,
and although this discussion focuses on just some aspects--albeit important
ones-of CALFED's troubles, those aspects are grounded in a complex
context. Yet underlying all that detail lies the story of a typical
environmental dilemma, and its faltering resolution illustrates the
importance of developing better conceptual approaches to environmental
management and law.
I. CREATING THE TENSIONS: CONVENTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND CALIFORNIA'S
WATERS
For decades, allocating California's waters has caused controversy. The
state's waters support diverse, economically and ecologically important, and
legally protected ecosystems, but agricultural and municipal water needs are
120 Of course, while resource users may embrace this principle in the abstract, they may be
reluctant to acknowledge the need for such margins for error in particular instances, or even to
agree that non-compliance with environmental mandates is a problem worth avoiding. See
generally Thompson, Tragically Difflcul supra note 72 (analyzing resource users' common
resistance to protection of resources upon which they depend).
121 The premise of this statement, based largely on my own interactions with agency staff, is
that many agency personnel are motivated not by (or not just by) desires to serve powerful
stakeholders, aggrandize power, or minimize workload, as various legal theories of agency
behavior might suggest, but instead by a personal commitment to doing their jobs well.
Different employees may disagree about what that means-a Bureau of Reclamation staffer
might aspire to deliver water despite environmental complications, while a Fish and Wildlife
Service staffer might take pride in stopping environmentally destructive deliveries-but I think
most agency staff are at least partly motivated by a desire to serve what they perceive to be the
public good.
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enormous, and total demands often exceed supply.122 Those competing
demands create tensions, and litigious water wars, often involving the Bay-
Delta, as distinctively Californian as Hollywood or the Golden Gate
Bridge.l23
Though the conflicts are complex, the conceptual model described
above summarizes the competing goals Californians hold for their water and
the challenges they face in achieving those goals. Water in California is a
regulated commons, with widespread access and limited overall quantities.
Californians generally wish to consume lots of water, want reliable access to
that water, and expect protection of the state's water-dependent natural
systems, even as their consumption places those systems under strain.
Further complicating matters, the amount of available water varies with
changing precipitation patterns and evolving human and environmental
needs. Consequently, managers allocating California's waters must
determine not only how much protection to provide and how much
consumption to allow, but also how reliable that consumption will be when
the weather turns dry. As discussed in detail in the following sections,
California's water management schemes have often addressed those
challenges in dysfunctional ways.
A. The Physical Environment
To someone spending a winter in Eureka, in the northwest corner of
California, Wallace Stegner's description of California as a "semi-desert with
a desert heart" might seem odd. Much of northern California receives
extraordinary amounts of rain and snow. Areas of northwestern California's
mountains are doused by 140 inches of precipitation in an average year.12 5
Those storms then migrate eastward, piling up Sierra Nevada snowpacks
that fill rivers through spring and summer. 26 Even some of California's
urban areas would not appear, from a brief glance at an annual precipitation
map, to be dry. San Francisco, for example, receives an annual average of
twenty to twenty-five inches of precipitation.'27
122 See generally 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supm note 110, at 3-8 to 3-9. (describing the allocation
of California's water); DAVID CARLE, INTRODUCTION TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA 3-4 (Phyllis M.
Faber & Bruce M. Pavik eds., 2004); HUNDLEY, supra note 10.
123 See cases cited supra note 7.
124 STEGNER, supra note 72, at 60 (quoting Walter Webb's description of the American west);
see CARLE, supra note 122 (explaining that Eureka's winter rainfall typically exceeds 50 inches);
see also Cal. Dep't Water Res., Rivers and Water Projects Maps, http://www.water.ca.gov/maps/
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (containing maps of California's natural and manmade water
systems); U.S. Geological Survey, Average Annual Precipitation in California,
http://education.usgs.gov/california/maps/callforniaprecipitationl.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2007) (providing a map of California's average annual precipitation).
125 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Natural Res. Conservation Serv., Caifornia Annual Precipitation
Map (2007), ftp://ftp.ftw.nrcs.usdagov/pub/prism/maps/Cazip (last visited Nov. 17, 2005); 2 2005
WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-1.
126 U.S. Dep't of Agric., Natural Res. Conservation Serv., supra note 125; CARLE, supra note
122, at 3-11 (describing California rainfall patterns); 2 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-1.
127 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., National Res. Conservation Serv., supra note 125.
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Rich ecosystems evolved in dependence upon that precipitation. Prior
to the dams of the twentieth century, rivers swollen with Sierra Nevada
snowmelt flooded much of the Central Valley each spring, creating habitat
for millions of waterfowl.128 Hundreds of thousands of salmon spawned in
those same rivers. 12 9 The rivers met saltwater in the Bay-Delta, which then
was an enormous and wildlife-filled maze of channels and marshlands. 13 In
the southern San Joaquin Valley, Tulare Lake, formed by the discharge of the
Tule, Kaweah, and Kings rivers, lay at the heart of another vast and
explosively fecund wetland system. 3' Even in the deserts of southern
California, runoff pooled in playas, creating oases amid the dry heat.13 2
Precipitation maps, however, and the historic extent of California's
wetlands are deceptive.'33 In summer, when temperatures are hottest,
California gets little rain. Though much of the Central Valley floods each
spring, by May unwatered areas turn "dead and dry and crisp, as if every
plant had been roasted in an oven."34 Only isolated thunderstorms water the
Sierra Nevada. Even the rain forests of the northwest coast rely on fog and
stored groundwater for summer sustenance. 35 Further south, the aridity
isn't just seasonal. Many of California's most populated areas-the Los
Angeles Basin, San Diego, and their suburbs-are near-deserts, with only
limited and episodic winter rainfall. 36
California's natural environment is dynamic. In average years,
California produces 71 million acre-feet 137 of runoff, but the variations are
immense 34 In 1983, for example, heavy rains fed 135 million acre-feet of
runoff, while in 1977 the statewide total was 15 million acre-feet. 39
128 CARLE, supra note 122, at 38-39 (showing the extent of California's historic wetlands);
LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 4 ("overhead skies blackened with migrating birds");
Harrison P. Dunning, Confronting the Legacy of riAigated Agriculture in the West: The Case of
the Central ValleyProjec4 23 ENvTL L. 943, 945 (1993) (describing historic seasonal wetlands in
the Central Valley).
129 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(describing the historic abundance of San Joaquin River salmon); LITrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra
note 5, at 4 (describing "reports of salmon runs so dense that rivers looked like pavement")
(internal quotations omitted).
130 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 17-18.
131 MARK ARAX & RICK WARTZMAN, THE KING OF CALIFORNIA 48-49 (2003); see CARLE, supa
note 122, at 71 (quoting James Carson's 1852 description of Tulare Lake).
132 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 6 (showing historic wetland locations).
133 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 98 (1986)
(discussing the "uneven distribution of water resources" in California).
134 JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 3 (1911).
135 CARLE, supra note 122, at 52-53.
136 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Natural Res. Conservation Serv., supra note 125 (describing
average annual precipitation in California); CARLE, supra note 122, at 78 ("[Tlhe west coast's
most populated, most urbanized region... receives less than two percent of the state's
precipitation.").
137 An acre-foot of water is an amount sufficient to flood one acre of land one foot deep.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 19 (16th ed. 1986).
138 See CARLE, supra note 122, at 23-31.
139 Id. at 23.
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Catastrophic floods have occurred throughout California's history. 4 0 The
floods of 1997 washed away campgrounds in Yosemite National Park and
temporarily resurrected Tulare Lake. More recently, Governor
Schwarzenegger warned of the potential for New Orleans-style disasters in
the Bay-Delta region and sought federal assistance to repair two dozen
levees. 1 4  Dry years also are extreme, and often occur in succession;
California's 1987-1992 drought was the latest episode in a longstanding
pattern. 4 2 Tree ring studies indicate that California, like much of the
southwest, has experienced dry periods far longer than those of the past
century, and sooner or later such extended droughts will recur.
143
California's natural reservoir systems somewhat mitigate this climatic
variability. Mountain snowpacks usually last well into summer, ensuring that
in most years runoff continues long after precipitation ceases.1"' Some
precipitation also infiltrates the subsurface, remaining in aquifers that
replenish streams and supply wells as surface runoff diminishes. 145 But each
of these reservoir systems has its limitations. California's snowpacks are
variable and have been declining, and because almost all of California's
snow melts each year, snowpack reserves primarily mitigate intra-annual
variability. 46 Groundwater reserves do last from year to year, but many of
the state's aquifers are already depleted, and mining overdrawn aquifers can
cause subsidence of the ground surface, raise pumping costs, and deplete
streams by depriving them of recharge. 47 Consequently, irregular surface
flows remain a fact of life in California.
Other sources of natural variability similarly affect California's
hydrologic systems. Because many aquatic species are legally protected,
fluctuations in fish and wildlife populations can have direct consequences
for water supplies. Earthquakes have an enormous potential to disrupt
California's water system, potentially limiting water deliveries to southern
California or the San Francisco Bay area." Human activities create
140 Id at 29-30; HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 79-84, 236-37; Rapanos v. United States, 126 U.S.
2208, 2242 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the wildly variable hydrology of the'Los
Angeles River).
141 Andy Furino, Bush Facing Levee Pressure, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 20, 2006, at Al; see also
CARLE, supra note 122, at 29-30.
142 CARLE, supra note 122, at 23-25; Hydrologic Classification Indices, supra note 17
(showing historic variability); 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-27.
143 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-27; Cal. Dep't of Water Res., Background-
Droughts in California, http://watersupplyconditions.water.ca.gov/background.cfm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2007) (describing past climatic variations).
144 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-9 (illustrating California's water cycle).
145 See id, at 3-1, 4-640; Sax, supra note 71, at 270 ("[groundwater] functions as one form of
insulation against both drought and increasing regulation").
146 See Katherine Hayhoe et al., Emissions Pathways, Climate Change, and Impacts on
California, 101 PROC. OF THE NAT'L AcAD. OF SC. OF THE U.S. OF AM. 12422, 12425-26 (2004),
available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/l01/3412422 (describing declining
snowpacks).
147 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-14 (estimating statewide overdraft at
between one and two million acre-feet annually).
148 See Mike Lee, Weak Levees Threaten the State's Economy and SD. Water Supply, THE
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 5, 2006; 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-29 to 4-30; see also
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additional dynamism. New land use developments, upstream forestry
practices, pesticide applications, and species introductions all can further
alter the state's aquatic ecosystems, affecting both the amount of water in
rivers and environmental needs for those flows.
Perhaps the most significant source of variability is anthropogenic
climate change.'49 Simulation models predict global warming will drastically
reduce Sierra snowpacks, decimating the capacity of California's primary
freshwater storage system.15° Even if overall runoff remains steady, that
runoff is likely to occur in larger pulses earlier in the year; floods will be
larger and when California needs water themost, less will be available. 5 '
Rising sea levels will further complicate water management. Bay-Delta water
users already struggle with saltwater approaching drinking-water intakes
and below-sea-level lands present huge flooding threats, and those problems
will grow as polar icecaps melt.15 Additionally, climate change may increase
the vulnerability of many water-dependant species by raising water
temperatures and relocating climate zones uphill or further north.
Because of all this dynamism, California's waters do not conform to
George Perkins Marsh's idealized description of nature's "almost unchanging
permanence of form.""5  Even without human influence, aquatic
environments fluctuated chaotically, and human activity, though sometimes
intended to impose stability, has also introduced new sources of dynamism.
B. Engineering Systems and Environmental Impacts
As California grew from a sparsely settled frontier into the nation's
most populous state, its precipitation patterns created demands for
infrastructure that could store and move water, and Californians repeatedly
turned to water supply engineers to keep floods at bay, make deserts bloom,
and help cities grow."5 The result was one of the most extraordinary
plumbing systems in the world.'5 5
id., at 4-27 to 4-32 (describing other potential threats).
149 See CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., PROGRESS ON INCORPORATING CLIMATE CHANGE INTO
MANAGEMENT OF CALIFORNIA'S WATER RESOURCES 2-5 (2000), avadlable at
http://baydeltaoffice.water.ca.gov/climatechange/DWRClimateChangeJuly06.pdf.
150 See, e.g, Hayhoe et al., supra note 146, at 12425-26; 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110,
at 4-33 to 4-34.
151 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-33 to 4-34.
152 Id. at 3-15 to 3-16, 4-35; see MAURICE Roos, Accounting for Climate Change, in 4 2005
WATER PLAN, supr note 110, at 4-622 (noting that rising air temperatures could increase
agricultural water requirements and warm rivers, with detrimental impacts on salmon and other
cold-water fish).
153 BOTIUN, supra note 93, at 54 (quoting GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1864)).
154 The engineers were almost always employed by some level of government. Because of
capital-intensive requirements and low returns, major private irrigation projects rarely
succeeded. See W. M. HANEMANN, The Econonic Conception of Water, in WATER CRISIS: MYTH
OR REALITY 61, 74-76 (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds., 2006); see generaly REISNER, supra note 10
(criticizing the history of government-sponsored water development throughout the American
west).
155 See United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 98 (1986);
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Cities and local irrigation districts initially developed their own
infrastructure, 156 but by the middle of the twentieth century, perceived
engineering needs had outgrown the capacity of local governments to
respond. The state and federal governments then took the lead, and turned
-to the Bay-Delta watershed as their primary source of water.'57 In the 1930s,
the United States Bureau of Reclamation"ts began developing the Central
Valley Project (CVP), a massive project that would ultimately tap the
Trinity, 59 Sacramento, and San Joaquin watersheds and provide millions of
acre-feet of agricultural water supply, much of it pumped from the southern
edge of the Bay-Delta.' 6° In the 1960s, DWR built a parallel project, the State
Water Project (SWP), which relies primarily on dams on the northern Sierra
Nevada's Feather River and pumps in the southern Bay-Delta. 61 The SWP
now delivers millions of acre-feet of water to southern California, with
municipal suppliers in the Los Angeles and San Diego areas and Kern County
agribusinesses taking the lion's share.162 By the 1980s, water projects had
dammed all but one of the Central Valley's rivers, and only a few major
watersheds, mostly in the coast ranges of northwestern California, remained
largely untapped. 163
These water projects shaped modern California, partly by providing
enormous benefits. California's reservoirs offer both flood and drought
protection, mitigating some of the effects of dynamic precipitation
patterns. 6" Their waters irrigate some of the most productive agricultural
areas in the world.'6 5 The Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego areas
have grown into bustling urban regions and economic powerhouses. 166 From
HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 204; CARLE, supra note 122, at 89 (showing engineered
redistributions of California water). Other systems-for example, Indus River irrigation projects
in Pakistan or the exploitation of the former Aral Sea's tributary rivers-are similar in scale, but
no other project combines such scale with California's resolute indifference to topography. See
MCNEILL, supra note 82, at 157-82.-
156 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 426-27 (1983) (describing Los
Angeles' water supply efforts); HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 121-202, 230-34 (chronicling Los
Angeles' and San Francisco's efforts); see generally Brian E. Gray, The Battle for Hetch Hetchy
Goes to Congress, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 199 (2000) (chronicling San
Francisco's effort to flood the Hetch Hetchy valley).
157 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 234-302 (chronicling the development of the Central
Valley Project (CVP) and State Water Project (SWP)).
158 Referred to hereinafter as Reclamation.
159 A diversion on the Trinity River sends water into the Sacramento River. See Westlands
Water Dist. v. Dep't of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 860-63 (9th Cir. 2004).
160 United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 98-99; see
HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 234-76.
161 United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100; see HUNDLEY,
supra note 10, at 276-303.
162 See CARLE, supra note 122, at 127-28 (showing SWP allocations).
163 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 312-13.
164 See 4 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-646 to 4-650 (showing capacity and uses of
California's reservoirs); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 49 ("Large water
projects provide some degree of protection against those fluctuations.").
165 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-4.
166 CARLE, supra note 122, at 88 ("enormous population growth of Southern California and
the San Francisco Bay Area was made possible by damming distant rivers"); HANEMANN, supra
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San Joaquin Valley farmers to San Francisco restaurateurs to Silicon Valley
high-tech manufacturers, almost all Californians now depend, on a daily
basis, upon water procured from someplace far away.167
The costs also were immense.16s The projects were expensive both to
construct and to operate, and the general public bore much of the financial
burden and continues to provide multimillion dollar annual subsidies to
some project operations. 169 The environmental consequences were drastic. 7 °
Tulare Lake-once larger than Lake Tahoe--no longer exists. 171 Many
stretches of California's rivers, including areas famous for both scenic
beauty and recreational value, now lie submerged beneath reservoirs.
172
Others-most notably the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam-for long
periods received none of their historic flows." Those environmental
impacts in turn have had major economic impacts, including, despite
expensive hatcheries, the near extirpation of many commercial, recreational,
and tribal fisheries. 74
Because of increasing public awareness of those costs, the era of grand
infrastructure construction eventually came to a halt. 75 The State Water
Project never was completed. Before dams could be constructed on several
of California's northwestern rivers, first the state government and then
Congress designated them as wild and scenic.17 6 Plans to construct a
note 154, at 84-87 (concluding that water supply probably is a necessary though not sufficient
condition for economic growth).
167 See REISNER, suprm note 10, at 333 ("The whole state thrives, even survives, by moving
water from where it is, and presumably isn't needed, to where it isn't, and presumably is
needed.")..
168 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, suprn note 53, at summary (observing that
Reclamation's "allocation often comes at the expense of urban, environmental, and Native
American water users, and at a large cost to taxpayers").
169 See id. at 13 (describing CVP subsidies); REISNER, supra note 10, at 334 (describing the
SWP as "one of the country's foremost examples of socialism for the rich"), 347-55 (describing
the funding for the SWP); Envt'l Working Group, California Water Subsidies,
http://archive.ewg.org/reports/watersubsidies/part2.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2007)
("[Diepending on how the market value of the water is defined, CVP farmers are receiving
between $60 million and $416 million in water subsidies each year." The CVP's water recipients
argue that the subsidies are much smaller.); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER SUBSIDIES:
BASIC CHANGES NEEDED TO AVOID ABUSE OF THE 960-ACRE LiMIT 17-18 (1989), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat12/139927.pdf (claiming that evasion of acreage limitations was
increasing federal subsidies); Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 805-06 (9th Cir.
1990) (describing average subsidies of $1,850 (in 1990 dollars) per acre).
170 See Dunning, supra note 128, at 951-54.
171 CARLE, supra note 122, at 71-72 (describing the loss of Tulare and Buena Vista Lakes).
172 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 366-73.
173 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909-11 (E.D. Cal. 2004);
CARLE, supra note 122, at 71 ("All of those rivers [in the Tulare Lake basin] have stretches below
the foothills that are now completely dewatered.").
174 See, e.g, Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2005)
(describing harm to the Trinity River's salmon fishery); CARLE, supra note 122, at 138-46.
175 See HuNDLEY, supra note 10, at 302-64; 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-7 ("Rising
costs and the enactment of state and federal environmental legislation have resulted in few
major development projects being built since 1980.").
176 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 312-13; Harrison C. Dunning, California Water Will There
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"peripheral canal," which would have connected the Sacramento River
directly to southern California's aqueducts, were rejected by the state's
voters, many of whom perceived the canal as a southern California water
grab.1 77 In the past twenty-five years, new dam construction has been limited
and water supply development has occurred primarily through increased
conservation, changed management of existing supplies, and increased
extraction from the existing infrastructural system. 178
Partly because development ceased, California's major water projects
deliver less water than their proponents had hoped. The State Water Project,
originally intended to deliver approximately 4.2 million acre-feet per year,
has averaged only approximately 2.3 million acre-feet.1 79 The Central Valley
Project has come closer to its proponents' expectations, but in drought years
some CVP users also have faced major cutbacks.18 0 Nevertheless, water
deliveries continued to grow even after dam construction largely stopped,
increasing even through the first years of California's 1987-92 drought. 8 '
Though deliveries then dropped, following agreements and legislation
designed to reallocate some water to in-stream flows, Bay-Delta exports
then climbed again, reaching all-time highs in the years preceding the 2007
pump shutdown.
8 2
The growth in consumption has extended the enormous environmental
impacts of water project operations past the development era' 83 Water
quality and quantity problems are chronic in many of California's rivers; in
summer, significant stretches of many rivers have no water at all184
Be Enough?, 25 ENVIRONS 59, 59-60 (2001) (describing the battle over the north coast rivers).
177 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 313-34 (describing the defeat of the peripheral canal
proposal); LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, sup/a note 5, at 10 (describing the peripheral canal
proposal). See, e.g., ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 123-25 (explaining potential
benefits); Kevin Yamamura, Governor Endorses Canal, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 15, 2007, at A3,
available at http://www.sacbee.com/capolitics/story/223870.html.
178 ELLEN HANAK, WATER FOR GROWTH: CALIFORNIA'S NEW FRONTIER, at v (2005) ("[Tlhe old
way of doing business-damming up rivers and building aqueducts to move the captured
surface water-is... no longer a viable strategy for accommodating growth."); ENVISIONING
FUTURES, supra note 1, at 38-42.
179 CARLE, supra note 122, at 92, 127-28 (showing 2002 actual deliveries); see Planning and
Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 n.5 (2000) ("there is a huge
gap between what is promised and what can be delivered"); id. at 914 n.7.
180 See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing cutbacks
in the mid-1990s); HANAK, supra note 178, at 7 ("Since the late 1980s, a series of court rulings,
administrative decisions, and legislative actions have prompted the return of some developed
water sources to instream flows and wildlife habitats.").
181 See ENvTL. DEF., FINDING THE WATER: NEW WATER SUPPLY OPPORTUNITIES TO REVIVE THE SAN
FRANCISCO BAY-DELTA ECOSYSTEM 2 (2005), available at http'//www.environmentaldefense.org/
documents/4898_FindingWater.pdf (showing pumping levels).
182 Id.; see also LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 5 ("highly engineered water projects
divert nearly 9 million acre-feet, or roughly one-third of the [Bay-Delta] watershed's supply of
freshwater").
183 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-7 ("environmental requirements are not
always met").
184 See CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., 2002 CWA SECTION 303(D) LIST OF WATER
QUALITY LIMITED SEGMENTS (2003), available at http://www.waterboards.ca-gov/tmdl/
docs/2002cwa303dlistofwqis072003.pdf; 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-16 (showing
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Replacement of the San Joaquin River's freshwater by agricultural return
flows has changed water quality so drastically that the river, though arising
in Sierra Nevada wilderness areas, is known as the "lower colon" of
California."5 The Bay-Delta also has been severely changed, and now is
managed largely to convey freshwater to in-Delta water users and the south
Delta pumps. Partly because of that pumping and the altered flow regime,
many of the fish species that live in or migrate through the Bay-Delta face
extinction, and water quality violations are chronic.'
Despite this scarcity and degradation, California's recent water
management history also contains many positive stories. In most years, most
Californians do have enough water. v8 7 Californians are becoming more
creative in managing, conserving, and reusing water supplies, and both
urban and agricultural conservation could feasibly achieve great reductions
in water use."s8 In some reports, DWR has predicted that overall water use
could decrease, even as population grows, through aggressive conservation
and demand management. 8 9 Some non-governmental studies conclude the
conservation potential is much greater than DWR's estimates. 90 Agricultural
land retirement, though politically controversial, also holds enormous
potential to reduce water demand, and desalination may become more
realistic.'9 ' Altering economic incentives by removing subsidies, requiring
unmet environmental flow objectives); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 7
(observing that multiple California rivers have average flows below levels considered necessary
to sustain instrean wildlife).
185 CARLE, supra note 122, at 108.
186 See Thomas, supra note 10, at 8 ("today the single greatest threat to the estuary is direct
alteration and diminution of natural stream flows"); HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at. 398-99
(describing the Bay-Delta's ills); 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-25.
187 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-4 ("California meets most of its agricultural,
municipal, and industrial water management objectives in most years"). But see 2 id, at 3-8 ("In
dry years, California's water supply is inadequate to meet its current level of use....").
188 See generally HANAK, supra note 178 (explaining how conservation, management, and
reuse may be able to meet California's future water demand); 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note
110, at 3-4, 3-12 (noting that urban water use has remained steady since the mid-1990s even as
urban populations have grown), at 4-25 (noting trends of increased agricultural efficiency and
decreased land use); 2 id, at 3-3 (showing trend toward more efficient irrigation techniques, but
also showing how much land remains irrigated by less efficient gravity-drainage and sprinkler
systems), ch. 16 (discussing water recycling), ch. 20 (discussing land use planning and water
conservation), ch. 22 (discussing urban water use efficiency). The Water Plan Update notes that
"water use efficiency and conservation approaches have become a viable long-term supply
option, saving considerable capital and operating costs for utilities and consumers, avoiding
environmental degradation, and creating multiple benefits." Id at 22-2.
189 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-17, 4-20 to 4-21 (showing projected demand
under multiple future scenarios), 2 id, at 1-5 (showing potential demand reduction or supply
augmentation).
190 See, e.g., PETER GLEICK ET AL., WASTE NOT, WANT NOT: THE POTENTIAL FOR URBAN WATER
CONSERVATION IN CALIFORNIA 7 (2003), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/urban-usage/
waste-notwant_not_full report.pdf [hereinafter GLEICK ET AL., WASTE NOT].
191 See Mike Taugher, State Plans to Retire Haff of Water District's Farms, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, June 20, 2006 [hereinafter State Plans]. See generally 2 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110,
(describing increasing use of, and interest in, desalination). For a detailed discussion of
desalination, see HEATHER COOLEY ET AL., DESALINATION, WITH A GRAIN OF SALT: A CALIFORNIA
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beneficiaries to fully pay for storage and delivery infrastructure and for
environmental mitigation, and charging user fees that bring water costs
somewhat closer to market values all could similarly reduce demand." 2
Environmental restoration also is an increasing theme of California water
management, albeit outside the Bay-Delta; in recent years, Californians have
takei significant steps toward restoring Mono Lake and the Trinity, Owens,
and San Joaquin Rivers. 9
Nevertheless, in many ways California water management remains a
near zero-sum challenge of managing a variable and often scarce commons.
Millions of people want to use California's water, and thousands of
competing institutions attempt to supply not only those needs but also
anticipated future demand increases. Though in most years people get the
water they need, aggregate demands speak for most water available even in
good years, and in dry years shortages are likely to be endemic.
9 4 With
environmental systems degraded and ecological needs partly unmet,
9 5
intermittent shortage is now a fact of life.196 Consequently, California's water
managers face the constant challenge of balancing consumption and
protection of a scarce, valuable, and variably-available resource.
C. The Legal Regime and Its Inherent Tensions
The legal system for managing California's water is as complex as the
plumbing systems it governs and the dynamic ecological systems it protects.
Both the federal and state governments have extensive and intertwined
systems of constitutional, statutory, and common law applicable to water
resources management. Those laws complement an intricate contractual
regime, and the statutes are implemented and contracts administered by a
PERSPECTIVE (2006).
192 See 2 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 8-2 to 8-3 (describing benefits from economic
incentives), 3-4 (recommending economic incentive measures); Terry L. Anderson & Pamela S.
Snyder, Priming the Invisible Pump, PERC POL'Y SERIES (1997), available at
http://www.perc.org/perc.php?id=746 (describing how economic incentives could induce
farmers to switch to higher-value crops and use less water).
193 See Craig Anthony Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell, Litigation s Bounded Effectiveness and the
Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 8 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2001) (describing the Mono Lake controversy); Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 878 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding plans to increase Trinity River
flows); Lewis Sahagun, In Owens Valley, Water Flows Again, LA. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at B1;
Glen Martin, Settlement WillRestore San Joaquin River, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2006, at B1.
194 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-7, 3-11; Ryan Waterman, Addressing
California:s Uncertain Water Future by Coordinating Long-Term Land Use and Water Planning:
Is a Water Element in the General Plan the Next Step 310 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117, 120-22 (2004)
(describing, pessimistically, California's water prospects).
195 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-18 to 3-26 (summarizing challenges faced by
California's hydrologic regions).
196 See MARION W. JENKINS ET AL., IMPROVING CALIFORNIA WATER MANAGEMENT: OPTIMIZING
VALUE AND FLEXIBILITY, 6-3 (2001), available at http://cee.engr.ucdavis.edu/faculty/lund/
CALVN/Report2/CALVINReport2001.pdf ("Planning to always supply all water 'requirements'
everywhere is prohibitively expensive without massive subsidies and would impose politically
intolerable environmental impacts.").
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diverse set of governmental institutions-many of which act at cross-
purposes.1 97 The entire system contains uneasy juxtapositions borne of
diverging political agendas and varied historical roots. The frontier impulse
to conquer the wilderness, the New Deal-era's infatuation with massive
government sponsored infrastructure, conservative predilections to use
government for the benefit of large business interests, and modern
preferences for environmental protection all have left lasting imprints on
California water law, and those competing influences have helped create a
system plagued by internal tensions."8 Many elements of that legal system
encourage aggressive consumption; yet mandates for baseline levels of
environmental protection are stringent and inflexible, at least in theory, and
reliability, though valuable to both human consumers and environmental
systems, enjoys little protection. The system thus epitomizes the traditional
management approach described in Part H1; to the extent its conflicting
requirements and incentives can be resolved into a coherent whole, it
mandates backstop protections yet promotes consumption right up to those
legal limits.
1. The Appropriative Rights System
The legal system's incentives toward consumption derive partly from
the traditional doctrinal rules of western water law. Most 9 9 surface2 0 0 water
allocation in California is governed, at least in theory,2 0 1 by prior
appropriation law.102 Under that system, a user establishes a surface water
197 These institutions include regulatory agencies like EPA, the California State Water
Resources Control Board, and the Fish and Wildlife Service, among others, and resource
management agencies like Reclamation and DWR, which build and manage water projects
without exercising regulatory authority.
198 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10 (describing the influences of various political movements
upon California water development).
199 Not all California surface water rights are appropriative. Many riparian rights remain,
Native Americans hold sovereign rights, the federal government can reserve rights, and a few
cities possess pueblo rights held over from California's time as Mexican territory. See, e.g., Lux
v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 (1886) (recognizing riparian rights); City of L.A. v. City of San Fernando,
14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975) (sustaining Los Angeles' pueblo rights); In re Water of Hallett Creek
Stream Sys., 44 Cal. 3d 448, 455 n.3 (1988) (describing federal reserved rights); Escondido Mut.
Water Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm., 692 F.2d 1223, 1235-37 (9th Cir. 1982)
(acknowledging reserved water rights held by several southern California tribes). However,
because most California water allocation occurs, at least on paper, through the appropriative
system, the primary focus of this Article is appropriative rights.
200 Groundwater allocations in California are subject to a separate and far less
comprehensive system of regulation, a circumstance which has received extensive criticism.
See Sax, supra note 71, at 98.
201 Because of limited monitoring of withdrawals and enforcement of violations, some
scholars have argued that in practice California's system really is closer to riparianism, and that
legal rules bear only loose correspondence to actual practice. See HANEMANN, supra note 154, at
72 n.23; see also Benson, supra note 58, at 886-88 (arguing that other states prioritize protecting
established uses over enforcing prior appropriation doctrine's rules).
202 For concise basic descriptions of prior appropriation law, see SAX ET AL., supra note 10, at
98-99 or Benson, supra note 58, at 886-87.
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right by obtaining a permit from the State Water Resources Control Board, 03
removing water from a stream, and putting it to reasonable and beneficial
use.2 4 The scope of a right depends upon the actual extent of that
reasonable use, and an appropriator cannot, in theory, possess a right to
more water than he actually needs and uses.0 5 The priority of the right-the
extent to which it subordinates, or is subordinate to, the rights of other users
of the same water source-is a function of timing; the first person to perfect
a water right becomes senior to others.20 6 -She then may use her entire right
in dry years, even if no water will be left for other junior appropriators.20 7 So
long as she continues to reasonably exercise that right, she will not lose it.20"
The appropriative rights system does not preclude full allocation of a
river, and instead can encourage aggressive water use. The need to withdraw
water from a stream to establish a right and the greater priority of earlier-
established rights create incentives to pump water out of rivers as soon as
possible.2 9 Once a right is established, the threat of forfeiture discourages
conservation; water saved, under traditional prior appropriation doctrine, is
water lost.210 No payment for the actual water is required; instead, it
essentially is free for the taldng so long as a permit exists.1 Consequently,
many rivers are so fully appropriated that paper allocations exceed actual
flow,212 and a fair number of California's rivers unnaturally run dry.213 These
incentives have led to widespread criticism that prior appropriation doctrine
203 CAL. WATER CODE § 1260 (West 2007); see Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
3d 419, 441-42 (1983) (explaining the evolution of a permitting requirement). Prior to 1914, no
such permitting requirement existed, and an appropriative water right was created merely
through diversion and beneficial use. United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal.
App. 3d 82, 102 (1986).
204 See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist. (EDF v. EBMUD I1), 26 Cal. 3d 183,
195-98 (1980) (describing the steps necessary to apply for and perfect a right).
205 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 105 ("This r7ue of
reasonable use'is now the cardinal principle of California's water law.") (emphasis in original).
206 Id. ("[A]ppropriators are limited by priorities in time; their rights are subordinate to the
rights of preexisting holders.").
207 SAX ET AL., supra note 10, at 99. But see HANEMANN, supra note 154, at 72 n.23 (observing
that seniority is often difficult to enforce).
208 United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 101 ("[O1nce rights to
use water are acquired, they become vested property rights.").
209 See Thomas, supra note 10, at 13-14.
210 See N. Kern Water Storage Dist. v. Kern Delta Water Dist., 147 Cal. App. 4th 555, 572
(2007) ("[Tlhe rights holder is subject to forfeiture for not using water, a practice generally
thought to be socially responsible and usually called 'conservation.'") (emphasis in original).
211 See HANEMANN, supra note 154, at 76-78 ("[Tlhe prices which most users pay for water
reflect, at best, its physically supply cost and not its scarcity value ... there is no charge for the
water per se."); Thomas, supra note 10, at 13 ("The appropriator is not required to compensate
the public, as predecessor in title, in any way.").
212 This circumstance is not as absurd as it may seem. Because most water users return
some water to the river (unless they export the water to a different basin), the same molecule of
water can be diverted multiple times as it passes through a watershed. See HANEMANN, Supra
note 154, at 72.
213 See CARLE, supra note 122, at 71; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supm note 53, at 7.
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is an inefficient historic relic, a legal system indifferent to ecological needs
and prone to accelerating resource overexploitation.
214
Partly in response to such critiques, California has reformed its
appropriative system in ways designed to encourage efficiency and
environmental sensitivity. In recent decades, for example, water-marketing
advocates have succeeded in creating statutory provisions allowing transfers
of water rights.2 15 The rationales for marketing are straightforward:216 if
conserved water can be transferred rather than lost, inefficient users should
have an incentive to curb excesses and sell savings, and other needy users
may obtain conserved water rather than developing new supplies.
217
Environmental water needs also could be met, in theory, by purchasing
water from willing sellers who presumably can provide that water with
reduced opportunity costs.21 Additionally, agricultural and urban users
could minimize treatment costs by transferring higher quality water used by
agricultural users, who do not need treatment, for lower quality water
previously allocated to municipal use.219 Transfers are limited by multiple
factors, however, including fears of third party effects, limited access to
water-conveyance infrastructure, and principles of California law and
aquatic ecology that are somewhat incompatible with marketers' attempts to
treat water as a fungible commodity.2 0 Consequently, while many water-
214 See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 38-45
(1996); Thomas, supra note 10, at 13-14.
215 See, e.g, Cent. Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405(a), 106 Stat.
4600, 4709-12 (1992); CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (West 2007). For a sampling of arguments in
favor of water marketing, see Anderson & Snyder, supra note 192; MARC REISNER & SARAH
BATES, OVERTAPPED OAsIS 58-59 (1990); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 32.
216 Critiques of water marketing also are powerful. The most common criticism is that the
externalities of water marketing are difficult, if not impossible, to mitigate, and often are
ignored. Eg, Freyfogle, supra note 214, at 27 (arguing that because of externalities, water
marketing fails to bring about efficient water use practices); Joseph W. Deilapenna, The
Importance of Getting Names Right The Myth ofMarkets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 317, 349-52 (2000) (explaining that the consideration of externalities makes water
markets prohibitively expensive). Other critics criticize allowing private parties to profit-
sometimes immensely-by selling water conferred upon them by heavily subsidized projects,
Eg, Tim Stroshane, Water Transfers and the Imperfect Water Industry in California 8
BERKELEY PLAN. J. 66 (1993).
217 See Thomas, supra note 10, at 45-57 (recommending a market-based strategy for
providing environmental flows); 2 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, ch. 23, at 23-6 (describing
potential economic benefits of water transfers). But see id, at 23-6 to 23-7 (describing some of
the potential costs of transfers).
218 See JENKINS ET AL., supra note 196, at xvii (noting that while some environmental flow
requirements produce substantial opportunity costs for would-be users, others do not); 1 2005
Water Plan, supra note 110, at 4-43 to 4-44 (predicting that a statewide market could reduce
some of the opportunity costs created by environmental protection requirements).
219 1 2005 Water Plan, supra note 110, at 25.
220 See HANAK, supra note 178, at vii-viii (2005) (describing sources of third-party
resistance). Several statutes protect "areas of origin" against water transfers. See, e.g., CAL
WATER CODE §§ 10505, 11460, 12201 (West 1992). A California appellate court recently rejected
the establishment of a private surface water bank. Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res.
Control Bd., 124 Cal. App. 4th 245, 253 (2004).
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marketing advocates believe water trading, though growing,221 remains
overregulated and underutilized, other commentators question whether real
water markets ever can or should exist.
222
The appropriative rights system also has increasingly tolerated instream
flow rights. Historically, while the state could limit rights in order to protect
environmental values, an appropriator could establish and sustain a water
right only by taking water out of a river.22 Recognizing the anti-
environmental incentives of this rule, the California Legislature has
repeatedly amended the state's Water Code to allow appropriators to
dedicate portions of their rights to instream use, and to allow the state to
claim rights in instream flows.22 Nevertheless, the prohibition on directly
appropriating instream rights remains, and, like water marketing,
appropriative protection for instream flows remains limited.
Two older doctrines, one deriving directly from the state constitution and
the other from ancient common-law principles, also create potential for
flexibility and environmental protection within California's water rights
system. First, the California Constitution allows water rights only to the extent
that a use is "reasonable."225 That amorphous word grants state regulators and
courts discretion to modify rights based on evolving conceptions of
reasonability, for "no one can acquire a vested right to the unreasonable use of
water."226 That rule can mandate reductions in the place, purpose, or amount
of use, and on occasion actual or threatened invocations of reasonable use
doctrine have significantly changed water use.227
The public trust doctrine also creates potential for conservation within
the traditional water law system. Under California law, water rights users
221 For data on the amount of water marketing actually occurring, see ELLEN HANEK,
CALIFORNIA'S WATER MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS (2002), available at http://www.ppic.org/
content/pubs/op/OP_1002EHOP.pdf.
222 See, e.g, Scott S. Slater, A Prescription for fuflling the Promise of a Robust Water
Market 36 McGEORGE L. REV. 253, 293-94 (2005) (discussing continuing impediments to water
marketing). But see Freyfogle, supra note 214, at 28-29 (criticizing water marketing on both
utilitarian and normative grounds); Dellapenna, supra note 216, at 320.
223 Thomas, supra note 10, at 15; Brian E. Gray, A Reconsideration ofInstream Approprative
Rights in California, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 667, 668 (1989). For discussion of the challenges of
implementing instream flow protections, see Jack Sterne, instream Rights & Invisible Hands:
Prospects for PR vate Instream Water Rights in the Northwest 27 ENVrL. L. 203, 206 (1997).
224 Thomas, supra note 10, at 15; CAL. WATER CODE § 1707(c)(1) (West 2007).
225 CAL. CONST. art 10, § 2.
226 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 443 n.23 (1983); see Envtl. Def.
Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist. (EDF v. EBMUD 1), 20 Cal. 3d 327, 344 (1977) ("What constitutes
reasonable water use is dependent upon not only the entire circumstances presented but varies
as the current situation changes."); Joslin v. Main Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 140 (1967);
e.g., United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 129-30. (1986)
(upholding permit modifications in response to changing needs).
227 See generally Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d
548, 548 (1990) (upholding the State Board's determination that Imperial Irrigation District was
wasting water and needed to change its practices); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and
Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 941-42
(1998) (describing the Imperial Irrigation District litigation).
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may own usufructuary rights,228 but the state owns the water and
watercourses, and holds the latter as trustee for its people.229 That trust
obligates the state and all its agencies to consider whether water allocations
are consistent with values like wildlife protection,230 and no vested right can
exist if a use threatens such public trust values." Similarly, the public trust
doctrine empowers the state to reexamine permits already issued, and to
adjust those permits in light of evolving public needs.212 The doctrine thus
creates an inherent qualification upon property rights in water, essentially
granting the state discretion to treat the natural environment as the most
senior appropriator.
In combination, water marketing, instream flow rights, reasonable use
doctrine, and the public trust add complexity to a legal system otherwise
engineered simply to encourage widespread water use at the maximum
possible rate. Those doctrines do not remove incentives for water
consumption-even water marketing, which does create a conservation
incentive, generally does so only if someone is willing to pay to use the
conserved water-but the latter two allow a substantial amount of
discretionary, government-imposed flexibility, and the former two
theoretically allow water users ways to achieve greater efficiency and
protection. 23 But while some of those doctrines may undermine the basis
for expectations of reliability, they otherwise leave intact a system slanted
toward promoting water use.
2. Contracts
In practice, contractual arrangements are at least as important as
appropriative rights in determining the allocation of California's water, for
228 Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) ("IThe right of property in water is usufructuary,
and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.").
229 CAL, WATER CODE § 102 (West 2007) ("All water within the State is the property of the
people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the
manner provided by law."); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434-41
(1983); see Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties, 47 Cal. 2d 597, 626 (1957), rev'd on other
grounds, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (holding that the state holds title to all waters as trustee for its
people; the court did not consider the implications of this statement for the scope of
applicability of the public trust doctrine). For consideration of what exactly this type of
ownership entails, see California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1019 (2000).
230 Nat'l Audubon Socv, 33 Cal. 3d at 426, 434-41; see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine In Natural Resource Law- Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L REV. 471, 538-46
(1970).
231 See Nat'J Audubon Socy', 33 Cal. 3d at 425-26 (holding that the public trust doctrine
"bars... any other party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once it becomes clear
that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust"). The Audubon court held
that state agencies possessed discretion to accommodate the competing goals of the two legal
schemes. Id at 445-47.
232 Nat' Audubon Socv, 33 Cal. 3d at 447; United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182
Cal. App. 3d 82, 149-50 (1986).
233 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 104 ("Unlike real
property rights, usufructuary water rights are limited and uncertain."); id, at 106 ("no water
rights are inviolable; all water rights are subject to governmental regulation").
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most Californians receive water in accordance with contractual terms.
Those contracts, much like California's traditional water rights system,
generally are structured to promote consumption while providing few
guarantees of reliability.
Most Californians do not actually hold appropriative water rights.
Instead, they obtain water through municipal water agencies, water districts,
irrigation districts, mutual water companies, and a few other types of
governmental, quasi-governmental, or private water distributors.2 34 Many
obtain their water through a series of such entities.2 "8 Some of those
distributors hold their own appropriative rights, but many-particularly
those reliant on Bay-Delta water-depend in whole or in part on water from
the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project.236 Reclamation and
DWR, respectively, hold the appropriative rights for those projects, and
deliver water in accordance with the terms of long-term contracts.23 7
Those CVP and SWP contracts share some important common
principles. Rather than creating fixed entitlements to certain amounts of
water, both define maximum allocations while reserving state and federal
discretion to deliver less than the full amounts.238 The CVP contracts thus
allocate more water than the Bureau typically delivers, and allow the federal
government to withhold deliveries in times of drought or environmental
need.239 The SWP contracts similarly allocate more water-almost twice as
much water, in fact-than the project delivers in average years, but specify
mechanisms for allocating water in the event of temporary and permanent
shortages or unexpected surpluses.24 Both sets of contracts thus create a
234 See HuNDLEY, supa note 10, at 99-107 (describing irrigation districts and mutual water
companies); HANAK, supm note 178, at 2-3; 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-7 ("It is
estimated that there are more than 3,700 public and private agencies in California dealing with
some aspect of water supply, use, or treatment.").
235 The Metropolitan Water District (MWD) of Southern California, for example, wholesales
but does not retail water, and users in its service areas thus receive some of their water via
sequential deliveries from the State Water Project to Metropolitan to Metropolitan's member
agencies. See HANAK, supra note 178, at 2 (describing MWD); METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT,
THE DISTRICT AT A GLANCE (2007), available at http://www.mwdh2o.com/mwdh2o/pdf/
at%20a%20glance/mwd.pdf.
236 See Planning and Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 899-
900 (2000) (describing pre-1995 SWP contracts).
237 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 97 (describing the
CVP and SWP). Though a federal agency, Reclamation must obtain its water in accordance with
state law, and therefore is subject to SWRCB regulation. California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645, 647, 674-75 (1978).
238 While these provisions partly reflect the reality that water availability varies, there also is
a bureaucratic explanation for these contractual amounts: the CVP's and SWP's proponents
needed to promise large amounts of water to justify their projects. See generally REISNER, supra
note 10 (describing the booster culture of water development).
239 United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 147-48 ("the contracts
expressly provide for governmental immunity from any liability to the contractors due to the
failure to furnish the specified quantities of water in times of water shortages."); O'Neill v.
United States, 50 F.3d 677, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the federal government was
entitled to reduce deliveries in order to comply with environmental laws).
240 See Planning and Conservation League, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 908 n.5 ("there is a huge gap
between what is promised [by the SWP contracts] and what can be delivered").
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somewhat curious allocation system, in which paper rights can diverge
substantially from typical water availability or use.
In another important respect, the projects' contracts are quite different.
While the SWP contracts charge rates sufficient to cover the project's
operating and capital costs, the federal government subsidizes deliveries.
241
The CVP, like most Bureau of Reclamation projects, was predicated on the
somewhat Jeffersonian belief that small-farm agriculture brought
widespread public benefits and thus merited public financial support.242
Though the Bureau never has succeeded in delivering CVP water solely to
small farms,243 it does deliver water at substantially below-market rates.244
The CVP's contractors' payments do not cover project operating costs and
have barely begun to reimburse the public for the millions invested in
constructing the project.245 Even after attempted pricing reforms in the
1980s and early 1990s, CVP contractors remained heavily subsidized,246 and
recently renewed contracts will continue those subsidies well into the
future. 247 The consequences are predictable; as the Congressional Budget
Office has warned, "pricing structures... often provide no incentive to
farmers to use water efficiently and may even encourage them to increase
their water use."
248
California's primary water contract systems therefore utilize an odd
allocation methodology. Large paper allocations and cheap prices encourage
heavy consumption.249 But contractual terms create little legal justification
241 Advocacy groups argue, however, that some recipients-particularly agricultural users in
Kern County-are heavily subsidized. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, MISMANAGING THE STATE WATER
PROJECT 2-4 (2005), available atwww.citizen.org/documents/SWPreport05.pdf.
242 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 8-1 ("This is an example of a subsidy that was
designed to achieve a social goal that affects water use and agricultural development in the
West."); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supm note 53, at 29.
243 When the CVP was built, reclamation law forbade Reclamation from delivering water to
farms exceeding 160 acres in size, yet many farms in the CVP's proposed service areas were
much larger. The story of the federal government's failures to enforce those limits, or the later,
higher limits set by Congress in a series of concessions to Central Valley growers, is a
fascinating case study in the ability of political clout to trump law. See WORSTER, supra note 10,
at 243-56; Peterson v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 802-06 (9th Cir. 1990).
244 See Envtl. Working Group, supra note 169; REISNER, supra note 10, at 484. See also U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 169, at 9-10 (providing examples of water districts where
the subsidized cost is well below the "full cost" rate).
245 See HANEMANN, supm note 154, at 77.
246 Compare 4 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-34 to 4-35 (showing rates paid by CVP
contractors and other California water users), with Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water
Res. Control Bd., 124 Cal. App. 4th 245, 258 (2004) (discussing the rates, which ranged from
$260 an acre-foot to $700 an acre-foot, that a private water seller anticipated charging on the
open market). There are also structural reasons why agricultural water is cheaper than
municipal water it does not require treatment, is not available at the tap on demand, and isn't
pumped over mountain ranges. See HANEMANN, supra note 154, at 77. But there is little credible
dispute that agricultural users have been, and continue to be, heavily subsidized. See Peterson
v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 899 F.2d at 805-06.
247 See Envti. Working Group, supra note 169.
248 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 13.
249 See Letter from United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region IX, to Alan
Candlish, United States Bureau of Reclamation (Jan. 8, 1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/
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for contractors to expect certain deliveries.2 50 That contractual uncertainty
compounds the variability of the underlying rights, for the Bureau and DWR
have no power to contract around the inherent contingency of their
appropriations.2 5' Though encouraged to consume, water users therefore
have few legal guarantees of reliability.
3. Envirolunental Statutes
The third major component of the California water law regime is the set
of substantive and procedural obligations created by federal and state
environmental laws, whose protective mandates create no small tension
with the appropriative and contractual systems' incentives toward
consumption. Broadly speaking, these laws -define some outcomes-species
extinctions, or violations of water quality standards, for example-that
agencies must avoid, and establish mechanisms for public and private
enforcement, but they provide few requirements for protection beyond those
backstop prohibitions. They thus create potentially strict penalties for
consumption that goes too far but do little to compel reservation of margins
for error.
A comprehensive survey of these laws would require an entire book;
what follows is a cursory summary.
a Substantive Constraints
Perhaps the simplest law applicable to California waters is the federal
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA).252 While most water laws require some
sort of balancing or compromise; the WSRA's mandate is simple: once a
river is designated, no use may impair the values for which that river was
designated.2 53 Additionally, unless written into the authorizing legislation, no
obstructions of the river are allowed, and appropriations are extremely
limited.254 Environmental protection thus is prioritized above all else, and a
WSRA-protected stretch of river essentially is removed from the water
commons. But these protections, although stringent, apply primarily to
rivers on California's northwest coast or to stretches in terrain so rugged
that the possibilities for competing appropriative uses are limited.2
55
region9/nepa/letters/cvprenew.pdf ("We fear that retaining contract quantities that exceed
available supplies gives the impression of unreliable commitments and may imply a 'need' to
develop new supplies.").
250 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 147 (1986)
("Logically, neither the project nor the contractors could have any reasonable expectation of
certainty that the agreed quantity of water will be delivered.") (emphasis in original).
251 See State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674, 806 n.54 (2006) ("An
appropriator cannot give away more rights than he or she has.").
252 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (2000).
253 Id §§ 1271, 1281(a) (2000); see Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Green, 953 F. Supp. 1133, 1144
(D. Or. 1997).
254 16 U.S.C. § 1278 (2000).
255 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 374; Nat'l Park Serv., Wild and Scenic Rivers by State,
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Several federal and state environmental statutes establish more widely-
applicable requirements. The federal and California Endangered Species
Acts, for example, limit "take" of listed species, and compel water managers
to leave enough water in California's rivers to sustain and recover
threatened or endangered species' populations.256 The Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA) likewise allocates water to environmental
purposes, requires restoration projects, and establishes numeric goals for
recovering fish populations. 257 California Fish and Game Code section 5937
requires dam operators to maintain fisheries in good condition.258 In
combination, and with the help of numerous cases filed by environmental
groups, these statutes have become important constraints on water
management throughout California.
Both federal and state laws also protect water quality. The federal
Clean Water Act (CWA) limits point source discharge of pollutants and
requires identification of and remediation plans for waters with deficient
water quality.259 California law establishes parallel and intertwined
requirements. The federal CWA allows states to implement and enforce
federal water quality programs, and the state's Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act260 delegates that authority to state and regional water boards.261
These boards must set statewide water quality standards and must
promulgate and implement plans to achieve those standards.262 The federal
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision also facilitates public enforcement
of water quality laws, and numerous non-profit groups often prosecute
permit violations and other water quality transgressions.2 63
Other statutes grant the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB)
additional discretion to set environmental limitations on water use.264 The
http://www.rivers.gov/wildriverslist.html#ca (last Visited Nov. 18, 2007) (listing California's
federally designated wild and scenic rivers).
256 See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2050-97 (West 2007); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000); e.g.,
O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 1995).
257 See Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3406, 106 Stat. 4600,
4714-26 (1992).
258 See Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 218 Cal. App. 3d 187, 210 (1990) (requiring below-dam
flows sufficient to "restore the historic fishery"); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F.
Supp. 2d 906, 917-19, 924-25 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
259 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). Section 301
creates a blanket prohibition on point source pollutant discharges, subject only to the specific
exceptions set forth elsewhere in the act. Id § 1311. Section 303 requires identification of water
bodies with substandard water quality and development of plans to restore those waters. Id
§ 1313. Because water quality and quantity are commonly intertwined, the Clean Water Act also
can limit water diversions. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 17-18.
260 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL WATER CODE § 13000 (West 1992).
261 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 107-10 (1986)
(describing the federal and state schemes for water quality protection).
262 See City of Burbank v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 35 Cal. 4th 613, 619 (2005)
(discussing the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act); id. at 620-21 (discussing state and
federal water quality laws).
263 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
264 See EDF v. EBMUD II 26 Cal. 3d 183, 195-98 (1980) (summarizing the statutes conferring
discretion upon the SWRCB); EDF v. EBMUD 1, 20 Cal. 3d 327, 342 (1977) (the SWRCB's
1184 [Vol. 37:1145
20071 LA W, ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMISM RELIABILITY 1185
SWRCB may establish minimum instream flow levels.26 It may declare a
river or stream "fully appropriated," meaning that no further appropriative
rights can be obtained, and it need not wait for the stream to be pumped dry
before making such a declaration.2 66 It also may impose environmental
mitigation conditions on the exercise of water rights.267 Under the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), which requires identification of the
environmental impacts of government projects, the SWRCB and other state
and local agencies also must mitigate, if feasible, the adverse environmental
impacts of any water project they approve or build.2"8
In combination, these laws mandate levels of environmental quality that
do not presently exist in many California waterways. If fully and successfully
enforced, federal and state water quality laws would compel cleanup of
dozens of water bodies currently listed as water quality impaired, including
all of the Sacramento/San Joaquin Delta and portions of many of its tributary
streams.2 69 California currently has dozens of species listed under the state
or federal Endangered Species Acts, including many Bay-Delta-dependant
species, and both acts require those species' recovery.27 Similarly, the
CVPIA demands recovery of several degraded fisheries,2 ' and California
Fish and Game Code section 5937 may go even further, requiring restoration
of below-dam fisheries-in California, hundreds of river miles are below
dams-to historic levels.272 Finally, CEQA's mitigation requirement ought to
minimize additional environmental impacts even as project changes or
"authority includes protection of the environment"); United States v. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 103-04 ("when determining appropriative water rights, the Board is
expressly empowered to protect water quality") (citing CAL WATER CODE § 1258 (West 2007);
the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL WATER CODE §§ 13000-14968 (West 2007);
and the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21001 (West
2007)).
265 CAL WATER CODE § 1257.5 (West 2007). In making these decisions, the SWRCB must
consider instream flow proposals developed by the California Department of Fish and Game.
Id.; see CAL PuB. RES. CODE §§ 10001-03 (West 2007) (requiring CDFG to propose such flows).
But CDFG has proposed flows for very few streams. Thomas, supra note 10, at 40-41.
266 CAL WATER CODE §§ 1205-07 (West 2007); see CAL STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD.,
FULLY APPROPRIATED STREAMS LIST (1998), available at http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/
html/faslist.htm.
267 See EDF v. EBMUD 11, 26 Cal. 3d at 195-98; EDF v EBMUD 1, 20 Cal. 3d at 342; United
States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 103-04.
268 See CAL PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-177 (West 2007); Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 16 Cal. 4th 105, 112 (1997) ("CEQA is a comprehensive scheme designed to provide
long-term protection to the environment.").
269 See CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., supra note 184, at 43-45 (listing quality
impaired California water bodies); HANAK, supra note 178, at 7 ("The latest update of the
California Water Plan, which uses estimates provided by the environmental community, reports
that another one million acre-feet would be needed for some unmet environmental
objectives.").
270 See CAL. DEP'T OF FISH AND GAME, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED ANIMALS OF CALIFORNIA
2-12 (2007), available at http://www.dfg.ca'gov/biogeodata/cnddb/pdfs/TEAnimals.pdf.
271 See Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3406(b)(1), 106 Stat.
4600, 4714-15 (1992).
272 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 917-19, 924-25 (E.D. Cal.
2004).
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developments occur.2 73 Those laws severely limit the reliability of water use
patterns that impede environmental recovery; through citizen suit provisions
and strict substantive mandates, such uses face the ongoing possibility that a
successful plaintiff may succeed in imposing drastic changes.274
b. Procedural and Planning Laws
Complementing the substantive component of these environmental
laws is a set of federal and state laws, many recent, requiring proactive
water supply planning and seeking to avoid mismatches between supply and
demand. In theory, these laws can play a significant role in mitigating
conflicts between the protection and consumption goals of California law,
and can soften the harshness of substantive statutes, for they could alert
government decision makers and public participants to potential conflicts
before they occur. However, because these laws apply primarily to new
projects and new development, they are better suited to minimizing new
conflicts than to mitigating old ones. They thus do little-though not
nothing-to resolve the consume-to-the-brink incentives inherent in other
laws governing California's waters.
The foundational planning laws applicable to California water are
NEPA and CEQA. Both require environmental reports documenting-the
effects of, and alternatives to, government sponsored or approved
projects.27 Since the 1970s, California's courts, in applying CEQA, have
consistently held that an environmental evaluation of a water-consuming
project must disclose where the water will come from, and at what
environmental cost.276 Because CEQA, unlike its federal counterpart,
273 See CAL PuB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007) ("public agencies should not approve
projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available
which would substantially lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects").
274 Getting such an injunction is not easy, of course; plaintiffs must demonstrate
environmental degradation and establish causality, all in the face of scientific uncertainty, and
their remedies may be blunted by judges' equitable discretion. Nevertheless, environmental
laws have caused major and sudden changes in resource management before, and will likely do
so again. See generalyYAFFEE, supra note 1.
275 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000); see generally CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-177 (West 2007).
276 See, e.g, Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova,
40 Cal. 4th 412, 430-32 (2007); Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219,
1241-45 (2005); Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env't v. County of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. App.
4th 715, 720-24 (2003); Friends of the Eel River v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 108 Cal. App.
4th 859, 868-72 (2003); Napa Citizens for Honest Gov't v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors, 91
Cal. App. 4th 342, 371-74 (2001); Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 83 Cal.
App. 4th 892, 908-12, 919-20 (2000); Stanislaus Natural-Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus,
48 Cal. App. 4th 182, 194-206 (1996); Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford, 221 Cal.
App. 3d 692, 724-30 (1990); Santiago County Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d
818, 829-31 (1981); People v. County of Kern, 62 Cal. App. 3d 761, 771-73 (1976); People v.
County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 840-43 (1974). But see Sierra Club v. W. Side Irrigation
Dist., 128 Cal. App. 4th 690, 698 (2005) (upholding environmental review of a project involving
assignment of agricultural water rights to urban development).
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requires mitigation of adverse environmental effects, its disclosure
requirement has teeth, and in theory assures that the impacts of tapping new
water supplies should be considered and, if possible, mitigated prior to
implementation of any new project.1 77
The California Legislature recently supplemented CEQA with several
laws designed to prevent new development without identified and reliable
water supplies.27" In 1983, the Legislature enacted the Urban Water
Management Planning Act (UWMPA), which requires urban water suppliers
to adopt conservation plans.2 79 In 1995, the Legislature supplemented the
UWMPA by passing AB 901, which required water supply evaluations prior
to approval of new large development projects. 280 A follow-up study
suggested that the new law was largely ignored, and in 2001 the Legislature
enacted two more stringent laws linking water supply and planning.28 1 SB
221, the first of the two statutes, requires that detailed water supply
assessments precede approvals of major residential development projects,
and precludes approvals without adequate water supplies. 28 2 SB 610, the
second statute, requires water supply assessments as a component of CEQA
review, and also establishes more stringent requirements for urban water
management plans that anticipate reliance on groundwater.2 3 Preliminary
research suggests compliance with these new laws has been significantly
better than compliance with their predecessor.
28 4
In combination, these laws link growth and water supply planning and
appear to prohibit large-scale growth without water.285 They also create
some potential for reconciling the consumptive and protective goals of state
and federal law, for they could focus attention where under-watered growth
threatens to create excess demand.216 Nevertheless, because planning laws
are triggered largely by changes in the status quo, they do not compel or
create incentives for reductions in existing use.287 Moreover, California law
also embodies competing goals; though water districts cannot ignore
environmental constraints, they are similarly prohibited, at least in theory,
277 See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 2007).
278 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, 3-30 to 3-32 (describing new laws and planning
initiatives).
279 CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10610-56 (West 2007); see Waterman, supra note 194, at 162.
280 See Waterman, supra note 194, at 129.
281 Id. at 129, 152-58 (describing SB 221 and SB 610).
282 Id. at 152-58; see generally CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., GUIDEBOOK FOR IMPLEMENTATION
OF SB 610 AND SB 221 OF 2001 (2003), available athttp://www.owue.water.ca.gov/Guidebook.pdf.
283 CAL. WATER CODE § 10910 (West 2007); see also id. § 10540 (West 2007) (providing for
"Integrated Regional Water Management Plans").
284 HANAK, supra note 178, at viii.
285 Waterman, supra note 194, at 152-54. The statutes only apply to larger projects, and
unless CEQA applies, smaller scale developments still may occur without identified supplies.
286 See Planning & Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 914-15
(2000) (noting the adverse consequences that can follow if "local decision makers are seduced
by contractual entitlements and approve projects dependent on water worth little more than a
wish and a prayer.").
287 See HANA, supra note 178, at xi ("there are no automatic levers to induce conservation in
communities that choose not to conserve").
187
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from using planning laws to implement no-growth policies if additional
water supplies can be procured.2 "8 Consequently, while these laws may slow
the rate at which demand grows, they are unlikely to create any reduction in
overall water use or to resolve the tensions such use creates.
4. Water Conservation Laws
The final important, though to date relatively minor, component of the
legal scheme governing California water is a set of laws seeking to facilitate
conservation. Beyond its reasonable use requirement,"9 neither California
nor the federal government has an across-the-board rule requiring water
conservation. Several statutes, however, do provide incentives or, at least on
paper, limited mandates. Water Code section 375, for example, empowers
water suppliers to impose conservation requirements, though it does not'
require them to do so." Other provisions empower local governments to
mandate reclaimed water use for landscaping, create limited requirements
for recycled water use in toilets and cooling facilities, and attempt to
encourage (and allay fears about) water recycling. 291 Water Code sections
13577 and 13578 set the goal of recycling a million acre-feet per year by 2020
and charge DWR with recommending ways to achieve that goal. Finally,
California law now imposes almost across the board metering requirements
on residential (but not agricultural) use, which is a substantial improvement
in a state where water use in some dry areas has historically gone
unmetered.2 92
In addition, the California Legislature has repeatedly issued bonds,
generally accompanied with hortatory legislative findings promoting water
conservation, to provide funding for conservation projects. 293 The state's
Water Pollution Control Revolving Fund also provides money for
conservation and water recycling. 294 Additionally, state law requires DWR to
"offer assistance to agricultural water suppliers to implement efficient water
288 See Swanson v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 524 (1976) (upholding a
moratorium on new connections, but cautioning that a district must "exert every reasonable
effort to augment its available water supply in order to meet increasing demands").
289 See Neuman, supra note 227, at 941-42 (describing courts' application of beneficial or
reasonable use requirements).
290 See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65591-99 (West 2007) (requiring adoption of local
ordinances regulating landscape water use.).
291 See CAL WATER CODE §§ 13500-56 (West 2007); id. § 461 (West 2007) ("the primary
interest of the people of the state in the conservation of all available water resources requires
the maximum reuse of reclaimed water").
292 Id. §§ 500-30 (West 2007); see HANAK, supra note 178, at 13 ("many communities in the
Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys have traditionally charged flat fees for water, regardless of
the volume of use"). Assessing whether water use is reasonable is nearly impossible when one
cannot measure water actually used. See CAL. WATER CODE § 521 (West 2007).
293 CAL WATER CODE §§ 13955-69, 13999-99.19, 13450-69, 14050-76 (West 2007); PUB. POLIcY
INST. OF CAL, CALIFORNIA 2025: TAKING ON THE FUTURE 102-03 (2005), available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/reportIR_605MB2R.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA 2025]
(describing bonds). The CALFED program, for example, relied upon bonds to support its water
conservation efforts. Id. at 103.
294 CAL WATER CODE §§ 13480, 13481.5 (West 2007).
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management practices to improve the efficiency of water use,"295 and
requires agricultural districts to develop conservation plans-if they
"determine that a significant opportunity exists to conserve water."296 These
provisions generally offer financial carrots, however; they include neither
sticks compelling conservation nor mandates to limit the amount of water
extracted from the state's natural environment.
29
Federal law contains some similar provisions. The 1982 Reclamation
Reform Act, for example, required Bureau contractors to develop water
conservation plans, which the Bureau then would approve; though
"implementation of those plans typically has not been enforced," the
requirement remains. 298 The CVPIA established similar requirements,
mandating tiered pricing and allowing greater use of water transfers, which
theoretically create conservation incentives.29 9 But federal law, much like
that of California, creates few mandates for conservation and caps water
allocation only by setting maximum contract amounts, which typically are
far in excess of actual availability.
The federal and state water conservation laws therefore are, at best, in
their nascent stages, and appear more consistent with Vice President
Cheney's famous characterization of conservation as a personal virtue
300
than with the reality of a state faced with endemic water scarcities. Those
laws create no overall limits on use, and they endorse and empower but
rarely require conservation.
D. The False Promise of Flexibility
This legal system might superficially seem a reasonable response to
California's environmental realities. Though some parts of the legal scheme
encourage more water consumption and other parts demand protection of
the resources that consumption endangers, the system as a whole, by
preserving governmental discretion to impose cutbacks in times of shortage,
ideally might allow California to wring the maximum consumptive benefit
from wet periods while adaptively adjusting to dry years' environmental
constraints. 30 The system thus might appear to resolve the basic tensions
between consumption, protection, and reliability by encouraging
consumption right up to protective limits and sacrificing reliability, instead
invoking flexibility and adaptation to resolve any problems that result. In
295 Id. § 10904 (West 2007).
296 See also id. § 11952 (West 2007) ("encourag[ing]" conservation).
297 See HANAK, supra note 178, at xi, xiii ("[Tihere is more room in California's future for
regulatory actions backed by sticks rather than financial carrots.").
298 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 22.
299 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3405, 106 Stat. 4600, 4709-
14 (1992); but see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 36-37 (observing that few CVPIA
authorized transfers actually had occurred).
300 Richard Benedetto, Energy Plan Focuses on Production: Cheney's Ambitious Outiine is
Fuiendly to Oil, Critics Say, USA TODAY, May 1, 2001, at Al.
301 See United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 104 (1986)
(describing the variability of rights).
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practice, however, reliance upon theoretical flexibility and adaptability
seems misplaced, for the system also encourages optimistic expectations
and a sense of entitlement. That encouragement, in combination with the
often significant costs of adjustment, can make flexibility practically and
politically difficult to invoke.
People generally fear a loss more intensely than they covet an
equivalent gain-it is more threatening to lose fifty dollars you assumed was
yours than to miss out on a fifty-dollar windfall, particularly if you already
have made plans in reliance upon those fifty dollars-but the legal systems
for allocating California's water seem calibrated to inflame that tendency.
30 2
By giving water consumers paper contracts stating fixed quantities, they
encourage investment in water-dependent infrastructure and foster a sense
that full deliveries are a right; the users have the paper to prove it, even if
those amounts exceed what nature and existing infrastructure can
consistently and legally provide."° 3 Consequently, regardless of what judges
and scholars say about the inherent contingency of water rights, users may
believe that reductions are deeply unfair, if not outright confiscations of
property. Environmental statutes, the public trust doctrine, and reasonable
use requirements create countervailing expectations. The underlying
premise of the public trust doctrine is that water first and foremost belongs
to the public, meaning that users who infringe on trust values or
unreasonably use ecologically-needed water are essentially taking public
property.3°4  Regardless of what paper permits or contracts say,
environmental advocates therefore can reasonably perceive ecologically
beneficial flows as a public entitlement. Consequently, no matter how water
is allocated, at least someone will feel, except in the wettest of years, that
their water has been taken away, and will vigorously resist that perceived
loss. 30 5
302 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 77, at 1107-09; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Loss Aversion in Riskiess Choice: A Reference-Dependant Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039, 1039
(1991); Thompson, TAogicallyDifficul, supra note 72, at 263-65 ("[Wlhere the loss is risky and
uncertain, people often act as if there's virtually no future risk to them at all"). Those tendencies
help explain water management challenges, for they predict that users will prefer irregular but
drastic cutoffs-and will underestimate the likelihood of those cutoffs--to predictable, smaller
reductions, even though the latter may ultimately be less harmful.
303 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 17 (noting that Reclamation's
contracts and practices create the expectation of permanence); Thompson, TragicallyDifficuli;
supra note 72, at 257 (explaining the sometimes-counterproductive effects of property rights).
304 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 433-34 (1983) (describing the
historic origins of the public trust doctrine); Thomas, supra note 10, at 33 ("It is based on an
ancient recognition that some natural assets are of such fundamental and universal value that
they transcend the principles of sovereign dominion and exercise of exclusive rights.").
305 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 867 (describing competing senses of entitlement);
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 77, at 1108-09 (describing experimental evidence that a sense of
possession heightens the value people place on things); Russel Korobkin, Polieymaking and the
Offer/Asing Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV.
663, 698-703 (1994) (applying this theory to a hypothetical resolution of the spotted owl
controversy); HANAK, supra note 178, at xi ("[G]etting existing residents to share [water] is more
difficult because of the sense of entitlement that comes with existing water-rights law.").
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The regionalism and "tribalism"30 6 of water politics exacerbate these
senses of entitlement. The members of many of the interest groups involved
in California's water struggles live in somewhat insular communities, which
form fertile incubators for each group's sense of right. 07 Rural Central Valley
residents, for example, fairly uniformly support agricultural water diversions
and are skeptical of the demands of both urban users and
environmentalists.3" For San Francisco Bay Area residents, who tend to be
more favorably inclined toward environmental protection,3" the Central
Valley often seems a place with a totally different economy and political
culture. Similarly, north-of-Delta water users, though generally agricultural
and more skeptical of environmentalists' goals, also tend to be united in fear
of Southern California's reaching grasp.310 Urban users in southern
California, meanwhile, tend to live far away from, and may never see or even
be aware of, the areas impacted by their own water consumption. 31' Some
306 See Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmentl Tribaism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099,
1102 (2002).
307 Similar polarization can divide the agencies responsible for managing water, with wildlife
agencies and EPA often in tension with the Bureau of Reclamation and DWR, both of which
were founded to build dams and pump water. See generally Glennon & Thorson, supra note 10,
at 492 (questioning whether Reclamation can adjust its "traditional paradigm").
308 See, e.g., Stuart T. Pyle, Kern County View of a California Water Consensus, in ACHIEVING
CONSENSUS ON WATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA 87, 100 (1992) (describing environmental advocates
as "becoming more strident"). ACHIEVING CONSENSUS ON WATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA contains
several essays written from an agricultural perspective, and all evince skepticism of the
urban/environmental consensus view that agricultural interests have substantial amounts of
water to spare. See also Neuman, supra note 227, at 971 ("The agricultural community fears that
Los Angeles (either the city itself, or Los Angeles as a symbol for all urban areas in the West)
will somehow acquire all of the water from the farmers.") (parentheses in original).
309 That support turns lukewarm, however, when water comes from Hetch Hetchy. Though
Bay Area environmentalists have called for removing O'Shaughnessy Dam and restoring the
valley, San Francisco relies on Hetch Hetchy for both power and water, and city leaders have
opposed dam removal. Compare ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, PARADISE REGAINED: SOLUTIONS FOR
RESTORING YOSEMITE'S HETCH HETCHY VALLEY 1-3 (2004), available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/4044 -hetchhetchyrestored-frontmatter.pdf,
with Tom Philp, Water Bring Back Hetch Hetcy?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 21, 2002 (quoting
Diane Feinstein's assertions, while she was San Francisco's mayor, that Hetch Hetchy was San
Francisco's "birthright," and that removing it would be "dumb, dumb, dumb").
310 See, e.g., Family Water Alliance, Water Transfers: Sweetheart Deal or St. Valentine's Day
Massacre, http://www.familywateralliance.com/greenribbon/watertransfers.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2007) (urging caution on water transfers to Southern California); Don Killian, Owens
Valley Revisited, http://www.familywateraiance.com/farmOwensvalley.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2007) (arguing that events in Owens Valley, where Los Angeles' water acquisitions ended the
local agricultural economy, could recur in the Sacramento Valley). The Family Water Alliance's
website also disparages environmental protection efforts. See generally Family Water Alliance,
http://www.familywateralliance.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
311 See, e.g., LrTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 77 ("[Mlost Californians, particularly
those living south of the Delta, are not aware of the significance of maintaining the Bay-Delta
estuary."). Such ignorance is not unique to southern California. I once ate at a San Francisco
restaurant whose menu offered "filtered Hetch Hetchy water." The owners assumed,
apparently, that few customers would realize the exotic-sounding beverage actually flowed
from the municipal tap.
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integration exists, of course, but to a striking degree perceived interests are
uniform within, yet distinct among, California's various regions.312
This regional differentiation facilitates misunderstanding and distrust,
and each region has stories discounting the legitimacy of others' claims to
water. Southern California, in the eyes of many, is the phreatophytic land of
sprawl and hosed driveways, all supplied through a combination of
institutional arrogance and duplicity.313 The Central Valley is perceived as
the black hole for water over-consumption, a place capable of supplying all
unmet urban and ecological needs were it not so disdainful of environmental
protection and wedded to profligate use.3"4 Environmentalists, meanwhile,
are sometimes perceived as the foolish elitists who would stunt southern
California's growth and deprive agriculture of its lifeblood to sustain a few
precious fish.315 These stories validate and harden competing communities'
perceptions of entitlement,316 leaving these communities reluctant to
312 See id. at 60 ("Geography, more than party affiliation, defines water politics in
California."). These regional differences have translated into striking results when Californians
vote on water-related referendums. See, e.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 332 (describing 1982
voting over the peripheral canal), 369 (describing the 1974 vote on New Melones Dam).
Nevertheless, PPIC polling recently found a remarkable degree of consistency in statewide
views on water conservation; whether in the Central Valley or San Francisco, most voters
favored conserving existing supplies over developing new facilities. CALIFORNIA 2025, supra note
293, at 249.
313 The specter of Los Angeles' appropriation of the Eastern Sierra Nevada's waters looms
over almost all western water debates; with both agricultural and environmental interests
perpetually invoking the Owens Valley and Chinatown (the 1974 Jack Nicholson movie). E.g.,
Killian, supra note 310; Gary D. Libecap, Chinatown: Owens Valley and Western. Water
Reallocation-Getting the Record Strajght and What it Means for Water Markets, 83 TEx. L. Rev.
2055, 2057 (2005) (criticizing the conventional understanding of the Owens Valley history).
314 Marc Reisner was perhaps the leading articulator of this critique. Cadillac Desert
meticulously indicts the pork-barrel culture that produced most western water projects. In a
typical passage, which describes the San Joaquin Valley's Westlands Water District, he wrote
[tihere, in a nutshell, is how one of the nation's preeminent examples of reform
legislation [the Reclamation Act] is turned completely on its head: illegal subsidies
enrich big farmers, whose excess production depresses crop production nationwide and
whose waste of cheap water creates an environmental calamity that could cost billions
to solve.
REISNER, supra note 10, at 484. Reisner was far from alone; Wallace Stegner spoke for many
when he castigated water users' "snarling states'-rights and antifederal feelings whose burden
Bernard DeVoto once characterized in a sentence-'Get out and give us more money.'"
STEGNER, supra note 72, at 61.
315 E.g., Press Release, California Farm Water Coalition, Shifting of Farm Water Criticized
(Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.cfwc.com/should -know/SeptO4/9-20energy
studyresponse.pdf (criticizing an NRDC report as reflecting "an environmental agenda that
benefits only those radical groups seeking to take water away from farmers").
316 To a striking extent, these battles are among communities, and all sides tend to view
water as a "heritage resource," to use Joseph Sax's phrase. Whether environmentalists seeking
to protect the "common wealth," see Freyfogle, supra note 214, or urban users protecting their
communities' "birthright," or rural communities complaining of Chinatown-style water heists,
Californians seem consistently to "feel an attachment to their water that is strikingly similar to
the strong interest that nations and cultures assert over their antiquities and other cultural
properties." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Joseph Sax's Water
Law Scholarshfp, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 368 (1998) [hereinafter Thompson, Joseph Sax's
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acknowledge the contingency of their allocations, and further limiting the
flexibility theoretically inherent in California's water rights system.
History also complicates these problems. California's major water
projects were built and numerous contracts first signed before increasing
environmental awareness led many people to question the dogma that water
flowing to the ocean is, as Justice Jackson once colorfully put it, a "wasting
treasure[]" that rivers "thriftlessly dissipate... in the Pacific tides."31 7
Similarly, prior appropriation doctrine evolved when the West's population
was small, cities were few, and making the desert bloom was not merely a
device to strengthen the nation's economy but also an expression of
manifest destiny."' Many of California's water allocation habits were
predicated on the assumption that exploiting rivers was inherently desirable,
and entire regions of California have come to accept the consequences of
that assumption as the expected status quo.319 Bureaucratic cultures reflect
these views; the agencies that deliver California's water justified their
existence by promising large and consistent deliveries, and still often treat
delivering as much water as possible as a matter of institutional identity,
obligation, and pride.320  These expectations fuel indignation when
environmentalists assert that the status quo is not, and never was,
acceptable, and that environmental laws legitimately limit the amount and
consistency of consumptive use.
Finally, these problems are compounded by the extent to which water
managers, like many environmental managers, must rely on science when
adjusting allocations. A common reason for major delivery adjustments is
not total physical unavailability of water but rather a judgment that
ecological systems cannot sustain further strain.32' These judgments must be
made by often underfunded government scientists, who must predict future
conditions of complicated systems based upon limited data and partially
unknown chains of cause and effect, and who may be speaking to audiences
not cognizant of the prevalence of variability in ecological systems and
ambiguity in environmental science. 322 Their determinations are likely to be
Scholarship].
317 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 728 (1950); see CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 53, at 5 ("Other benefits that rivers provide-such as habitat for fish and
wildlife, recreation, and cultural values for Native Americans-were historically ignored").
318 See David Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can't We Get it Rght the First Time?, 34 ENVTL.
L. 1, 8-9 (2004). Many western boosters also argued, and many settlers believed, disastrously,
that irrigation actually would change the climate, and that "rain follows the plow." Id
319 See, e.g., Letter from Mike Wade, Executive Director, California Farm Water Coalition, to
the Bakersfield Californian (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.cfwc.con/shouldknow/
2004/July04/7-1%2OBak%20CA.pdf (applauding an editorial that decried the loss of water that
flowed to sea).
320 See Swanson v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 514 (1976) (positing a
perceived obligation to meet new growth with new supplies).
321 See James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate Cause: Lessons from Tort
Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water Users and Other Joint
Habitat Modiiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 598-99 (2003) (discussing this common scenario).
322 See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 10, at 18 ("[Nlatural resource regulation and
management decisions are typically not closely constrained by the available data, because those
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couched in uncertainties, and even if based on good judgment and careful
research may sometimes be wrong.323 Almost any recommendation for an
adjustment will therefore appear highly contestable, and resource users may
believe, or at least plausibly argue, that science was manipulated or misused
to deprive them of water.3
2 4
Consequently, rather than viewing their allocations as fundamentally
contingent upon, and variable in response to, environmental needs,
consumptive water users tend to expect consistency. While cognizant that
precipitation varies, they may perceive environmentally required reductions
as misguided at best and at worst as bureaucratic confiscations of
property.32 5 The reasonable use and public trust doctrines, though
theoretically providing the state with flexibility to adjust water allocations
based on evolving human and environmental needs,32 6 are rarely invoked for
these purposes, and in practice environmentally based water allocation
reductions infrequently occur other than in response to fairly inescapable
statutory mandates or payment of public money.3 27 That flexibility is not
moribund; deliveries do vary substantially from year to year as both
availability and demand vary in response to changing weather, and
environmental enforcement has compelled major changes in California
water allocations.32 Nevertheless, major environmentally-based adjustments
almost invariably induce protracted litigation,3 29 and the malleable, adaptive
data are so incomplete and ambiguous.").
323 See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (discussing scientific judgments in the Klamath controversy), 18
("ecology and the related biological sciences will never reach the precision and elegance of
physics and mathematics"); LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 31 ("Scientists rarely have
been able to link specific causes to specific changes in the Delta because of the complexity and
interconnectedness of numerous factors."), 66 ("uncertainties make it difficult to act decisively
and confidently").
324 See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 10, at 5-6 (observing that increases in scientific
information "if decoupled from increased understanding, can exacerbate controversy by making
it easier for people.., to selectively reinforce their beliefs"); see generally Owen, supra note
37, at 773-76.
325 The view of environmental protection as confiscation was perhaps most prominently
articulated in Tuiare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001)
("The federal government is certainly free to preserve the fish; it must simply pay for the water
it takes to do so.").
326 See United States v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 106 (1986)
(explaining this flexibility).
327 Recent Bay-Delta history is instructive. While water has been re-allocated, at least on
paper, to environmental uses, those reallocations occurred primarily in response to litigation-
forced regulatory actions (EPA's proposed new water quality standards and the federal wildlife
agencies' ESA listings), the CVPIA, and payment through the' Environmental Water Account.
Common law doctrines creating flexibility in water allocations may have helped facilitate these
changes but were hardly their cause. See in&a Part IV.
328 See, e.g, infra note 348 and accompanying text.
329 For example, the temporary cutbacks of the early 1990s generated a long succession of
cases. See, e.g., Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 599-600 (2005); Tulare Lake Water Basin
Storage Dist., 49 Fed. Cl. at 315-16; Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 95 (9th
Cir. 1996) (describing several other lawsuits); O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.
1995); Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 43 F.3d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1994).
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allocation system created, at least on paper, by California and federal water
laws does not match actual practice.
These limitations on flexibility mean that the systems governing
California's water try to have it all. Though water is scarce, federal and state
rules simultaneously attempt to maximize consumption and increase
protection. The system thus encourages environmental managers to do what
the basic conceptual framework posited by this Article predicts will be quite
difficult, that is, to promote consumption right up to the perceived limits of
environmental law, leaving no slack to facilitate adjustment should
conditions change. Yet users also demand reliability, and the flexibility that
might resolve these conflicts is severely limited by practical and political
realities. In the face of environmental uncertainty and dynamism, that
approach creates a recipe for conflict.
IV. THE CONFLUENCE OF TENSIONS-THE BAY-DELTA CONTROVERSY
Hardly a river in California has been immune from the tensions created
by scarcity, environmental variability, and an internally inconsistent legal
system, but these tensions have been most visible and salient, and perhaps
also most important, in the Bay-Delta." ° The Bay-Delta is literally and
figuratively the place where California's water problems flow together.33 All
of the waters draining the Central Valley flow through it, large fish and
wildlife populations live within it, and each salmon born in the valley must
swim downstream through the Bay-Delta to reach the ocean and back
upstream to reach its natal stream and spawn.3 2 The Delta itself provides
much of California agriculture's irrigation water and is the source of at least
some of the drinking water used by approximately two thirds of
Californians; management to meet these needs dominates the Bay-Delta's
hydrology.' Its tributary rivers supply millions more, and because the Bay-
Delta's watershed supplies almost everyone in California with some of their
water, its fate is inextricably connected with statewide urban water
demand.' The state's agricultural economy also relies heavily on the Bay-
330 For other descriptions of the Bay-Delta history, see Little HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5,,
at 14-34; Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 837-76; Rieke, supra note 10.
331 See LrTTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 4 ("Everything is connected in the Delta.").
332 See U.S. Geologic Survey, Shaded Relief Map of California, http://education.usgs.gov/
california/ maps/shaded2.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
333 CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 2; DWR, THE STATE WATER PROJECT DELIVERY RELIABILITY
REPORT 2005, at 2 (2006) [hereinafter DELIVERY RELIABILITY REPORT]; see Notice of 1-Year
Finding on a Petition to List the Longfrm Smelt, 59 Fed. Reg. 869, 870 (proposed Jan. 6, 1994) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) ("The water exports from the Delta by far exceed those from any
other estuary on the west coast of North America."). Export pumping and associated water
releases cause major changes in within-Delta water flows and alter the location of the estuary's
freshwater/saltwater interface, while pumping pulls fish out of their migration pathways and,
often, into the pumps. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Delta Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg.
12,854, 12,859 (Mar. 5, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (describing the effects of
pumping); Critical Habitat Determination for the Delta Smelt, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,256, 65,257 (Dec.
19, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (also describing the effects of pumping).
334 See LriTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at i ("The Delta is so critical to California's
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Delta watershed as a sump for return flows, and the Bay-Delta's water
quality bears the signature of land use practices throughout much of
California.' California's water problems, in short, are the Bay-Delta's
problems, and the Bay-Delta's fate both depends upon and helps determine
water management statewide.
By the late 1970s, the Bay-Delta was showing the strains of these
conflicting demands.' Federal and state environmental regulators both
realized that increasing Delta exports, along with several other important
factors, were drastically degrading the Bay-Delta's ecology. 3 7 For years,
however, that realization translated into little protection. The State Water
Resource Control Board first set water quality standards that failed to
survive judicial review,' then set standards that EPA rejected as
insufficient to meet basic water quality goals, and then, in the early 1990s,
withdrew-on Governor Pete Wilson's orders-standards that initially
appeared stronger.339 EPA, while rejecting the state's efforts as inadequate,
set no standards of its own until it was sued, and Reclamation argued it was
immune from even the weak standards the state did create.3 0 Meanwhile,
exports grew, exotic species multiplied, 1 and un-screened diversions and a
variety of other human activities throughout the watershed contributed to
what EPA described as a "severe and continuing decline of the Bay-Delta's
fish and wildlife resources."1 2
future that no water policy will be successful if the estuary is not restored.").
335 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 136 (describing pollutant sources); Firebaugh
Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing some of the drainage
problems faced by fields in the San Joaquin Valley, and the threats they pose to both those lands
and downstream waters).
336 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. 4664, 4665-66
(Jan. 24, 1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).337 See id.; CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 2; Determination of Threatened Status for the
Sacramento Splittal, 64 Fed. Reg. 5963, 5973 (Feb. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.FR. 17);
Critical Habitat Determination for the Delta Smelt, 59 Fed. Reg. at 65,257; Notice of 1-Year
Finding on a Petition to List the Longfin Smelt, 59 Fed. Reg. at 870; Designated Critical Habitat;
Sacramento River Winter-Run Chinook Salmon, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,212, 33,214 (June 16, 1993) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. 226); Critical Habitat Determination for the Delta Smelt, 58 Fed. Reg. at
12,859.
338 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986) (overturning
SWRCB's 1978 standards).
M See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4665-67
(describing this process); Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 840.
340 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d at 127 (rejecting that
theory).
341 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 71-72.
342 Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin River,
and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4664 ("In large part
due to the effects of these water diversions.., the fish and wildlife resources in the Bay/Delta
estuary have deteriorated drastically over the past twenty years."); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 53, at 33 ("Reduced outflows of freshwater from the delta-resulting in part from the
CVP's water diversions-are a primary cause in the decline of many of those species.").
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California's 1987-92 drought brought conflicts to a head. In the first
years of the drought, DWR and the Bureau responded to heightened demand
by exporting more water than ever before. 3 " But the Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service then listed the Delta smelt
and winter-run Chinook salmon, once two of the Bay-Delta's most abundant
fishes, as threatened species. 34 4 EPA accelerated pressure for new state
water quality standards and then began drafting standards of its own;34 5 and
Congress passed the CVPIA,34 6 which, among other provisions, mandated re-
allocation of 800,000 acre-feet per year to environmental uses.34 7 These
actions caused a sharp reduction in water contractors' deliveries and an
intense political reaction.34 By the mid-1990s, an all out water war was a
real possibility. It seemed perfectly plausible that EPA and the wildlife
agencies would attempt, largely in response to environmental groups'.
advocacy, to further limit water exports and that water users would unite,
with tacit support from the state and federal water delivery agencies, to take
on the very structure of environmental law, and that urban and agricultural
users would simultaneously fight side-battles with each other.34 9
Though much litigation did occur,3 that all-out water war did not.
Several of the major agencies and environmental groups instead signed the
Bay-Delta Accord, an agreement that traded temporary reductions in water
deliveries for temporary and limited immunity from further regulatory
actions.35' The agencies also began the CALFED process, a collaborative,
multi-agency, multi-stakeholder effort to create a new program for
sustainable management of the Bay-Delta. Over the next several years, they
developed several alternative proposals, and the agencies ultimately issued a
joint federal-state record of decision (ROD) in 2000.352 Following issuance of
the ROD, the California Legislature authorized creation of the Bay-Delta
343 See Mike Taugher, A Struggle to Quench State's Thirst for Water, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Dec. 29, 2005 [herinafter Taugher, Struggle] (showing pumping levels).
344 See O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1995).
345 See Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin
River, and San Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 60 Fed. Reg. at 4664 (setting
those standards).
346 Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706-4731 (1992).
347 See HuNDLEY, supra note 10, at 406. See also Reclamation Projects Authorization and
Adjustment Act, 106 Stat. at 4714.
348 See Rieke, supra note 10, at 345; see also Notice of 1-Year Finding on a Petition to List the
Longfin Smelt, 59 Fed. Reg. 810, 814 (Jan. 6, 1994) (quoting then-Governor Wilson's observation
that "any program must begin by recognizing a disturbing truth: The Delta is broken").
349 See HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 398-407 (describing events preceding the CALFED
process); see Planning and Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892,
900-01 (2000) (describing the potential conflict between agricultural and urban users over SWP
supplies). All of this conflict was occurring while the 104th Congress was re-examining
environmental laws, and the Endangered Species Act "seemed in danger of snapping." Doremus,
supra note 3, at 51.
350 See supra note 329.
351 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 843; LIrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 14-
15 (describing the "truce"). The Bay-Delta Accord is reprinted in 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 97 (1995).
352 CALFED ROD, supra note 5; ITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 16.
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Authority, an agency designed to coordinate the CALFED effort, and
Congress provided federal agencies with similar-though more limited-
legislative authorization to participate in the CALFED process.3 3
CALFED's innovations were many. Most importantly, rather than
attempting to reconcile the separately made decisions of agencies with
diverging, parochial interests, it attempted to create what Freeman and
Farber describe as a "modular" regulatory structure allowing agencies to
collaborate and make collective policy choices." CALFED also sought to
prioritize information development and stakeholder inclusion; agencies
utilized the expertise of water users and environmental groups, while
CALFED sponsored scientific research and attempted to rely upon adaptive
management.' Finally, CALFED tried to please everyone; the program's
mantra was that stakeholders should all "get better together."356
To achieve these ambitious goals, CALFED developed novel regulatory
devices. Attempting to minimize the zero-sum nature of water conflicts,
CALFED created an "environmental water account," a system designed to
use willing-seller water exchanges to minimize the burdens created by
environmental restrictions and to allow flexibility for short-term
adjustments in pumping levels.35 7 More broadly, the CALFED agencies
attempted to design infrastructure and management programs that would
allow more pumping in winter, when-in theory-water would be more
abundant and less environmentally important.35 Using substantial funding
353 See LIxLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 28 (describing the federal and state acts, and
criticizing the limited involvement allowed by the federal act).
354 Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 853-57. While I hold a less sanguine view of the
CALFED process, Freeman and Farber's arguments about the importance of such "modular"
regulation are sound. Alternatively, agencies with conflicting agendas would separately develop
diverging programs for managing the same resources, and then attempt, perhaps partly through
proxy litigation (with water contractors battling environmental groups), to resolve policy. See
id at 839-40 (describing "regulatory fracture" and the problems it causes). For that reason,
Freeman and Farber's modest conclusion about modular regulation-it "may not be perfect, but
it has the potential to be better than the traditional approach"-seems eminently correct. Id. at
805.
355 Id. at 846-53 (describing CALFED's willingness to draw upon stakeholder ideas and
expertise); id. at 865, 889 (praising CALFED's science program); ImTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra
note 5, at 37 ("The ROD envisioned a CALFED that was guided by an assertive adaptive
management system."), 70.
356 ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 87. See also CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 9-10
(describing CALFED's interrelated objectives).
357 Brandt, supra note 10, at 427-28 (describing how the Environmental Water Account
(EWA) should function). See also Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 847-51 (describing the
EWA's creation).
358 E.g., Press Release, Cal. Dep't of Water Res., Interim South Delta Program Draft EIR/EIS
Release (Aug. 14, 1996), available at http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/newsreleases/
1996/Aug.14,96-So_DeltaPgmR2.html ("During high winter flows," the South Delta
Improvements Program (an element of the CALFED scheme) "would allow pumping at Banks
Pumping Plant to increase from 6,400 to 10,300 cfs."). But see, e.g., Determination of
Threatened Status for the Sacramento Splittail, 64 Fed. Reg. 5963, 5973 (Feb. 8, 1999) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17.1 1(h)) ("Dampening of peak spring flows by springtime diversions to
storage facilities to replenish depleted reservoirs has deleterious effects on estuarine
species.., which have evolved in a system with periodic spring flooding.").
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from stakeholders and several voter-approved bonds, the CALFED agencies
embarked on a major ecosystem restoration program, hoping, as one farmer
put it, that when "[ylou redesign the river, you restore it to a more natural
functioning, and hopefully you need less water to make the system work the
way it's supposed to-everybody wins.""' CALFED also made large amounts
of grant money available to agencies pursuing conservation projects.36 The
rhetoric and writing of the CALFED agencies emphasized adaptive
management; rather than irrevocably fixing their future course of action, the
agencies defined a broad program, with many desired items but no strict
commitment to implementing any particular project, and created a science
program designed to facilitate learning and adjustment.3 61 These innovations
are largely responsible for CALFED's initial reputation, at least in the legal
academic literature, as an exemplary process. 62
Nevertheless, one of the CALFED agencies' core choices created major
risks.363 Managing a dynamic, oversubscribed resource to provide increased
consumption, increased protection, and increased reliability is
extraordinarily difficult, yet that is exactly what the CALFED agencies
attempted.364 Rather than mandating cuts in consumption, the agencier
359 CARLE, supra note 122, at 189 (quoting Merced County rancher Chris Robinson)
(emphasis omitted).
360 Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3408(i), 106 Stat. 4600,
4729-30 (1992).
361 See CALFED ROD, supm note 5, at 6 ("The preferred program alternative is not intended
to define the site specific actions that will ultimately be implemented."). Many participants in
KPMG's survey agreed that one of CALFED's greatest accomplishments was "its success in
exposing all stakeholders to the vast complexities of issues, science, policy and politics that
encompass the Bay Delta" KPMG LLP, supra note 25, at 10.
362 E.g. Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 860-66 (favorably evaluating CALFED);
Thompson, Markets for Nature, supra note 9, at 309-11 (describing the potential advantages of
the Environmental Water Account); Rieke, supra note 10, at 366 (concluding that CALFED's
Bay-Delta Program's "open, inclusive, and collaborative processes are critical to making
decisions that will have a reasonable shelf life."); Brandt, supra note 10, at 427-28 (describing
how the flexibility of the Environmental Water Account draws together conflicting
stakeholders).
363 In addition to the problems described, below, the CALFED agencies premised their
program on fragile funding and faith in weak governance structures. Compare CALFED ROD,
supra note 5, at 4 ("California taxpayers, stakeholders, and the federal government will be
called upon to invest billions of dollars over the next decade on CALFED programs."), i"th
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, supra note 181, at 16 (describing uncertain future funding for the
EWA and other similar programs). Also compare Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 855-57,
906 (describing the governance structure, and arguing that it also created "obvious benefits"
and that "by all accounts, [CBDA] has been quite effective at promoting coordination"), with
Letter from the Little Hoover Comm'n to Governor Schwarzenegger and members of the
Legislature (Nov. 17, 2005), in LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5 ("Because of a faulty design,
the CBDA cannot effectively coordinate activities, push agencies to perform, or provide
rigorous oversight. It is unable to control or cajole."), and LrrTLE HOOVER COMM'N, Supra note 5,
at 27-28 (observing that state authorizing legislation "stripped any meaningful authority from
the Bay-Delta Authority," and that federal authorizing legislation limited federal involvement in
the CBDA), andid at 80 ("Key Meetings and Decisions Exclude Public Involvement").
364 See Mike Taugher, CALFED: Bay-Delta Authority Head ExitN CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May
26, 2005 (quoting The Bay Institute's Gary Bobker. "You can have your cake and eat it too-that's
the unspoken motto of CalFed.").
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assessed only programs designed, on the whole, to facilitate export
increases, 365 and did so while assuming they would continue pumping water
through the Delta.3 66 Even in their penultimate environmental study, a policy
of reducing overall consumption of Bay-Delta water earned only a terse
dismissal in an appendix; the CALFED agencies appear to have believed that
so long as some water not legally committed to environmental protection
remained in the system, they had no choice but to increase water
deliveries.3 1 Yet the CALFED agencies also promised environmental
recovery-legally, they had no choice-which they proposed to achieve
partly through augmentation of environmental flows.3s1 They thus proposed
to increase consumption and improve environmental conditions, while
leaving less unallocated water-less slack-in the system, yet they
simultaneously defined increased water supply reliability as one of their
core goals, and rhetorically endorsed the importance of achieving a lasting
program.3 69 These ambitions should be no surprise; the CALFED program
merely reflected the underlying policy goals inherent in the state and federal
365 See CALFED EIR, supm note 57, at 3-8, 5-3 to 5-20 (considering, as possible programs for
future management of the Bay-Delta, only options that could increase overall pumping levels); 1
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS: IMPACT ANALYSIS, in CALFED EIR, supra note 57, at CR-30 [hereinafter
CALFED EIR RESPONSE TO COMMENTS] (rejecting consideratiof of export caps or reductions).
The agencies also attempted to temper these increases by implementing a conservation
program, but that program was deliberately toothless. "The conservation estimates in the Water
Use Efficiency Program Plan," the agencies wrote, "are not targets, objectives, or goals.
CALFED is not mandating that these or any other levels of water savings be achieved." Id at
CR47.
366 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 42 ("CALFED worked under the premise that
the Delta's basic configuration should remain unchanged and that environmental goals could be
satisfied simultaneously with those of exporters and in-Delta interests.").
367 See, e.g., CALFED EIR RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 365, at CR-30 (describing how
a program that emphasized water efficiency would not achieve CALFED's primary objective for
water supply reliability). In subsequent litigation, the California Resources Agency has argued
that any reduction in deliveries would have jettisoned CALFED's basic goals, and southern
California water users have argued that such reductions were simply impossible. See Opening
Brief for Petitioner-Appellant California Resources Agency at 13-14, Laub v. Davis, No. S138974
& No. S138975 (Cal. Supreme Ct., Mar. 24, 2006); e.g., Petition for Review of Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California at 1, Laub v. Davis No. S138974 & No. S138975 (Cal. Supreme
Ct., Nov. 17, 2005) ("no evidence suggested the 'reduced exports' alternative was feasible").
368 To make sense of this seeming paradox, one must understand that paper allocations and
actual wet-water flows often diverge. Prior to the CALFED program, some Bay-Delta outflow
was theoretically surplus, meaning it remained instream but was not formally allocated to
environmental use. Meanwhile, contractual allocations greatly exceeded actual deliveries,
meaning there were substantial gaps between what contractors were allocated on paper and
what they actually received. By allocating more water to the environment, the CALFED
program created what on paper appears to be an environmentally-beneficial change. See Rieke,
supra note 10, at 349 (describing the Bay-Delta Accord as increasing environmental water
availability). But even as more paper water was committed to instream flows, those flows could
contain less wet water, partly because paper allocations are not always met, see ENVTL DEF.,
supra note 181, and partly because surplus unallocated flows that formerly remained instream
now could go to the contractors.
369 CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that solutions must "be durable"); see also
ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 196 ("the language of the CALFED era has been steeped
in assurances").
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legal regimes for managing California water. But by attempting to increase
consumption, protection, and reliability, the CALFED agencies predicated
their program upon a dangerous choice.
Even as the CALFED agencies moved forward with that plan, warning
signs abounded. The historic degradation of the Bay-Delta correlated with
increased water consumption, and almost every agency report on the Bay-
Delta's environmental problems pointed to accelerating water use as a major
contributing cause.3 70 Some agency biologists were skeptical of an approach
founded on increased exports, even if these increases were coupled with
ecosystem restoration efforts and selective wet-season pumping.371 As one
biologist put it, "[tihe real problem is too many straws in the water and not
enough left in the Delta for habitat."372 Funding also was tenuous; the
environmental restoration projects that the CALFED agencies hoped would
compensate for pumping increases would not be cheap, yet the agencies
created no funding mechanisms to compensate if state and federal budget
allocations ran short.37 3 Finally, the inherent dynamism and unpredictability
of California's watersheds was no secret. California's water managers were
well aware of the state's history of droughts and floods, its susceptibility to
earthquakes, and its vulnerability to climate change, and all of these threats,
as well as the widely-acknowledged lack of understanding of the Bay-Delta's
ecology, ought to have suggested the danger inherent in a program designed
to recover the environment and increase the amount and reliability of Bay-
Delta water use. Such a program might succeed if brilliantly implemented by
resourceful'and well-funded managers, and under relatively benign and
stable environmental conditions, but its chances of failure seem
uncomfortably large.3
370 See supra notes 337 & 342; CALFED ROD, supra note 5, at 2 ("diversions, along with
[several other factors], have had a serious effect on the fish and wildlife resources in the Bay-
Delta estuary").
371 Eg., 1 CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM, ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION PROGRAM PLAN, at C-
024714 (2000) (noting that Bay-Delta species "evolved under a flow regime with pronounced
seasonal and year-to-year variability"), C-024475, C-024477, C-024490 (describing the importance
of winter outflows to Delta smelt, longfim smelt, and splittail), H-000013 (FWS comments
expressing doubt about this approach); CALFED DIVERSION EFFECTS ON FISH TEAM, DIVERSION
EFFECTS ON FISH, at D-014884 (2000) ("High export rates in winter and spring appear to reduce
survival of important fish."); Determination of Threatened Status for the Sacramento Splittail,
64 Fed. Reg. 5963, 5968 (Feb. 8, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) ("Dampening of peak
spring flows by springtime diversions to storage facilities to replenish depleted reservoirs has
deleterious effects on estuarine species such as the splittail, which have evolved in a system
with periodic spring flooding.").
372 CALFED, ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD FOR THE BAY-DELTA PROGRAMMATIC EIR CASES, at H-
000006 (2000).
373 See LrrrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 41.
374 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 866 (summarizing, though not adopting, this
critique of the CALFED process).
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Despite some successes3 7 5 inherent fragility quickly began contributing
to major problems. In the years following the CALFED decision, pumping
increased, though not as much as the agencies had planned. 6 Populations
of several pelagic species, several already protected under the federal and
state endangered species acts, also plummeted, and the correlation was
suspicious at best. As one government scientist observed, "we have this
coincidence where entrainments are up, fish populations are down, and
water exports are up."37 The decline was not limited to just a few species;
while salmon populations seemed to be doing relatively well, most of the
pelagic species that permanently live in the Bay-Delta were in decline, and
new species were added to the Bay-Deita's already-long list of threatened or
endangered residents.37 By the spring of 2005, at least some of the agencies
responsible for managing the Bay-Delta seemed to recognize that they faced
a burgeoning crisis, and.state government began a "Delta Vision" process
designed to come up with a new plan.379 Meanwhile, environmental groups,
whose confidence in the CALFED process, DWR, and particularly the federal
government was almost completely gone, began returning to the courts. 8
Over the next two years, the pelagic species crisis only worsened. In
2006, surveys of fish populations revealed no improvement, despite another
year of fairly benign weather. 8 In 2007, after a dry winter, populations took
another nosedive. Annual counts revealed hardly any delta smelt-once the
Bay-Delta's most abundant fish-and the largest numbers seen anywhere
375 See Mike Taugher, Despite Spending Billions, Ca/Fed Can't Fix Delt, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, May 1, 2005, at A10 ("'Before you draw the conclusion that CalFed hasn't done anything,
you have to realize CalFed has done a hell of a job on half the problem,' said Greg Gartrell, an
assistant general manager at the Contra Costa Water District, referring to the salmon gains.");
Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 860-62 (describing other successes, including the (initial)
lack of pump shutdowns and successful implementation of new groundwater storage projects).
Fears persist, however, that the absence of pump shutdowns contributed to ecological declines,
and that increases in salmon populations may be undone by planned future actions. See Matt
Weiser, Reservoir Changes Stir Fears for Fish; State Offlicials, Anglers WorryAbout the Effect of
a Federal Proposal on Delta Salmon Runs, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 24, 2005; Editorial, Determine
the Cause of Delta Degradation, CONTRA COSTA TIMEs, Aug. 7, 2005, at F4 (noting that in early
2005, water agency officials denied biologists' requests to slow pumping rates).
376 See Taugher, Struggle, supra note 343 (showing pumping levels).
377 Matt Weiser, Smelt Study Will Focus on Water-Pump Deaths, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 15,
2005, at B1.
378 See sources cited supra note 17.
379 See Delta Vision, httpJ/deltavision.ca.gov (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
380 Eg, Planning and Conservation League v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. C 05-3527-CW
(N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 15, 2006) (preliminarily enjoining construction of the Intertie, an
infrastructure project designed to increase water deliveries to Reclamation's San Luis Unit);
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-CV-01207 OWW, 2007 WL 1577896, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) (challenging the Fish and Wildlife Service's biological opinions for future
management of the CVP and SWP); Pacific Coast Fed'n v. Gutierrez, No. C-05-3232 JCS, 2006
WL 194507, at.*1 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (challenging the National Marine Fisheries Services' biological
opinion for CVP and SWP operations); Barbassa, supra note .20 (describing California
Endangered Species Act litigation brought by the California Sportfishing Protection Alliance).
381 Mike Taugher, Delta Still Ailing Despite Wetter Year, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006,
at F4.
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were the dead fish caught at the DWR's pumps.382 Almost concurrently, a
state court judge ruled that DWR was violating the California Endangered
Species Act and threatened to shut down the pumps, and a federal judge
ruled that state and federal efforts to comply with section 7 of the federal
Endangered Species Act were legally deficient.A With few options left, DWR
shut down its pumps for one ten-day period, and then resumed pumping at
relatively low levels.' "Drastic times," DWR's director explained, "call for
drastic measures."38 Those drastic measures now appear to be in place, and
may become permanent; on August 31, 2007, a federal judge ordered a
temporary pump cutback that state officials predicted would reduce water
exports by a million acre-feet per year, and the officials anticipated that the
limitations might well become permanent. 38 6
Though important, export pumping does not appear to be the exclusive
cause of the crisis. Scientists are also evaluating other potential factors, such
as pollutant loading and invasive species,38 and many think a confluence of
stresses is the likeliest explanation.3 8 Reducing consumption also probably
would not be a complete solution; though it could reduce environmental
strains, such reductions alone probably cannot recover the Delta to a healthy
state. 9 But even if export increases are not the sole problem and reductions
should not be the singular focus of long-term solutions,39 0 their probable
contributing role confirms the danger inherent in attempting to achieve
environmental recovery while also increasing an acknowledged source of
environmental strain. At best, that approach substantially increased the risk
of troubles much like the ecological declines CALFED now faces; at worst, it
may have played a central role in causing them. Those declines also bode
poorly for the future of any CALFED-like approach. Near-extinctions and
major delivery cutbacks are exactly the outcomes the CALFED agencies
intended to avoid, yet few disagree with DWR's assessment that "[ijf we don't
fix the Delta"-which, of course, is what the CALFED agencies thought they
were doing"-this is going to start happening every year."391
382 See Taugher, Delta Smelt; supra note 19 ("the latest survey-which counts juvenile fish
about 3/ of an inch long-surprised some biologists with yet another massive drop-off"); Matt
Weiser, Fish Threatened with Extinction Shuts Delta Water Pumps, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 31,
2007.
383 See Barbassa, supra note 20 (describing state court litigation); Kempthorne, 2007 VL
1577896, at *31.
384 See Barbassa, supra note 20 (describing the pump shutdown); Weiser, supra note 19.
385 Pelletier, supra note 20.
386 See Taugher, supra note 21.
387 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 72-73 (discussing invasive species problems).
388 See, e.g, Mike Taugher, Delta Fish Populations: Agencies Mount Strategy Against Delta
Fish Die-off, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, June 19, 2005 (discussing various suspected causes of fish
die-offs in the Delta, including pesticide runoff, invasive species, and a change in salinity due to
changes in the water pumping schedule).
389 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 149 ("the Delta will never again be as it once
was").
390 See id. (advocating evaluation of several potential solutions, some focused on
infrastructure changes and other on pumping reductions).
391 Barbassa, supra note 20 (quoting Lester Snow).
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Though one of the CALFED's most salient failings, the pelagic species
collapse is not its only problem.392 On both process and substance, CALFED
fell short of its own goals. One of the most widely-praised of CALFED's
regulatory innovations-the EWA-became chronically short of funds. 3
Water quality problems are ongoing, and those problems triggered new
rounds of interagency litigation over responsibility for meeting in-Delta
water quality standards.394 Though water exports did increase for a while,
many of the infrastructure changes desired by water contractors have not
occurred, and the fisheries collapses now create doubt about whether some
of those changes ever will occur, or whether even pre-CALFED pumping
levels can. ever resume. 395 Adaptive management, though theoretically
central to the CALFED program, was largely absent.396 Finally, the political
consensus supporting CALFED was short-lived.39 7 Legislators blasted
CALFED's accomplishments and funded it reluctantly,39 beneficiaries
limited its funding by successfully opposing proposals to fund restoration
through water user fees,399 the Bush and Schwarzenegger administrations
provided little political support,4o" independent audits and reviews called its
decision making structure into question,401 water users and delivery
agencies chose to make key decisions outside of the CALFED process,4o 2
and many stakeholders quickly lost little faith that CALFED could achieve
its intended results.4 3 The innovative institutional arrangements lauded by
legal commentators soon appeared destined for an early sunset.4 °4
Meanwhile, many of the basic tensions underlying CALFED's troubles
are growing. According to some blueprints, consumption of Bay-Delta
392 See supra note 138 (describing vulnerable levees); see ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note
1, at 55, 58 (describing urbanization problems).
393 See ENVTL. DEF., supra note 181, at 16.
394 See, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 06-1318
(E.D. Cal. June 15, 2006).
395 See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Planning and
Conservation League v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 05-3527 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2006)
(enjoining construction of the Intertie Project).
396 See, e.g., KPMG LLP, supra note 25, at 11 (quoting one interviewee: "[wie have failed to
adaptively manage the program").
397 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 1.
398 See Freeman & Farber, supra note 9, at 873-75 (describing funding problems); ENvTL
DEF., supra note 181, at 16.
399 CALIFORNIA 2025, supra note 293, at 114, 131 (noting CALFED was supposed to use a
"beneficiary pays" approach).
400 See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 41, 56 (describing federal uninterest and
limited funding); Jody Freeman, Editorial, Why is Arnold Afraid of the Water?, LA. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2005, at Ml.
401 See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 66; KPMG LLP, supra note 25, at 12.
402 See LVITLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 5, at 80 (describing the "Napa Agreement," in
which several water users and water supply agencies set a program for future Bay-Delta
management without involving environmental stakeholders, the California Bay-Delta Authority,
or wildlife agencies).
403 See KPMG LLP, supra note 25 (describing stakeholder views of the program, and noting
that positive views mostly were based on achievements early in the program's history).
404 See Taugher, CALFED Reorganization, supra note 27.
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waters still is slated to increase. California's population continues to
grow,4" 5 with the heaviest growth likely to occur in hot, dry inland areas
with high per-capita rates of water consumption.40 6  Rather than
accommodating those population increases solely by increasing the
efficiency of water use-a solution that NGO reports and even DWR's own
California Water Plan suggest would be feasible-federal, state, and local
water supply agencies all indicated, even as the Bay-Delta's most recent
crisis worsened, their intentions to pump more water, much of it from the
Bay-Delta.40 7 Though called into doubt by recent events, these predictions
405 HANAK, supra note 178, at v ("[T]he absolute increases predicted over the coming decades
are indeed phenomenal. Between 2000 and 2030, the state is expected to add 14 million
residents, to reach a total of 48 million."); 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, ch. 3, at 3-4
(describing projected growth).
406 See HANAK, supra note 178, at v-vii, 8-11 (noting that half of all growth will occur in these
areas).
407 Reclamation recently renewed almost all of its long-term water supply contracts. See
Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Central Valley Project Water Contracts are
Renewed for Farms and Cities (Feb. 25, 2005), available at http://www.usbr.gov/
newsroomlnewsrelease/detal.cfm?RecordD=4281; Martin, supra note 30 (describing
controversies over contract renewals). Though some contractors rarely used their full
allocations, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed renewing at the full amounts and at subsidized
rates, and has stated its intent to deliver more water to some contractors. See ENVIRONMENTAL
WORKING GROUP, VIRTUAL FLOOD, available at http://www.ewg.org/reports/virtualflood
(describing projected increases in delivery amounts). Concurrently, the Bureau is proposing
actions to alter the CVP's infrastructure to allow increased deliveries, including raising Shasta
Dam and increasing the capacity of the south-Delta pumping system. See 2 2005 WATER PLAN,
supra note 110, ch. 5, at 5-2 to 5-3 (describing projects designed to increase south delta
pumping).
DWR has partnered in pursuing those infrastructure changes. Id.; see, e.g., CAL.
DEP'T OF WATER RES., SOUTH DELTA IMPROVEMENTS PROGRAM 1, available at
http://baydeltaoffice.water.ca.gov/sdb/sdip/documents/draft eis-eir/SDIP-brochure.pdf.
Additionally, in published reliability reports, DWR predicts the State Water Project can
reliably supply almost a million acre-feet more water than it has averaged in the past.
Compare DELIVERY RELIABILITY REPORT, supra note 333, at 17-18 (predicting SWP delivers
close to three million acre-feet per year), with Planning and Conservation League v. Dep't of
Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 n.5 (2000) ("Actual, reliable water supply from the SWP
is more in the vicinity of 2 to 2.5 maf of water annually."). Because California law now
requires demonstration of reliable water supplies as a condition precedent to major
development, local governments are likely to rely on DWR's predictions, and optimistic
projections could beget more houses and less conservation. See DELIVERY RELIABILITY
REPORT, supra note 333, at 2 (describing the report as a planning resource).
While many localities are conditioning new development on conservation and some areas
have utilized water shortages to slow new growth, few local agencies have shown the
inclination to reduce existing levels of use. See HANAK, supra note 178, at xi, 85-87; compare
Craig Anthony Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell, Litigation ' Bounded Effectiveness and the ReaI Public
Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath ofthe Mono Lake Case, 8 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1,
19-20 (2001) (describing conservation efforts in Los Angeles). Instead, local agencies' urban
water management plans generally predict unchanged per capita water consumption, and many
of those plans also project increased overall use, some of it from the Bay-Delta. See HANAK,
supra note 178, at vii (describing utilities' dubious projections of future surpluses), xi, 11
(noting that current trends suggest that per capita use will increase), 46-47 (describing MWD's
plans to take more Bay-Delta water), 85-87 (noting that current Urban Water Management
Plans as a whole do not project any reduction in per capita consumption).
1205
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
and the infrastructure projects designed to fulfill them still remain on the
table.40
8
Meanwhile, environmental protection requirements have not changed.
Despite the recent period of Republican political dominance, environmental
statutes remain largely intact, and political support for such changes has
been largely absent.41 Consequently, so long as water quality problems
remain chronic and species populations hover near extinction, citizen suits
or agency enforcement actions could again compel major changes in water
management. Yet political commitments to reliability also remain and may
even be growing. Property rights advocates have spent recent years
attempting, with partial-but. diminishing-success, to use constitutional
talings litigation to increase the certainty of water rights,410 and many
water users have sought regulatory commitments to the same effect.
4 1 1
Even as CALFED falters, California water management remains defined by
incentives to consume up to, or past, the brinks of illegality defined by
environmental laws, mandates for environmental, protection, and a
reluctance to relinquish reliability.
Nor have reform movements accomplished much to diminish these
underlying tensions. Faced with competing wants for more consumption,
protection, and reliability, many commentators have suggested the answers
lie in fundamental legal and administrative reforms designed to allow
greater institutional adaptability. Some environmentalists, for example,
408 As this Article goes to press, DWR's reliability report still predicts increased deliveries.
See DELIVERY RELIABILITY REPORT, supra note 333, at 17. DWR and the Bureau have delayed but
have not abandoned the South Delta Improvements Program, a project designed to increase
pumping capacity, and the Bureau of Reclamation is still attempting to proceed with the Intertie
project, which would have the same effect.
409 See, e.g., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., SPECIAL SURVEY ON CALIFORNIANS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 9 (2004) (finding broad public support for environmental protection); PUB. POLICY
INST. OF CAL., SPECIAL SURVEY ON CALIFORNIANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (2003) (also finding
broad public support for environmental protection); PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., SPECIAL SURVEY
ON CALIFORNIANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (2002) (finding most Californians believe strict
environmental regulations are worth costs to the economy); Harris Interactive, Three-Quarters of
US Adults Agree Environmental Standards Cannot Be Too igh and Continuing Improvements
Must Be Made Regardless of Cost (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
harris-poll/indey-asp?PID=607 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
410 See, e.g., Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314
(2001); Roger J. Marzulla, Taking and Water Rights, THE WATER REPORT, Nov. 15, 2005, at 1-6
(describing several pending cases); but see Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 138 Cal.
App. 4th 1261 (2006) (distinguishing and criticizing Thiare Lake); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v.
United States., 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007) (declining to follow Tulare Lake, even though the
two opinions were written by the same judge); Klamath Irrigation Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538
(2005) ("Thiare appears to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others and,
distinguishable, at all events") (emphasis in original).
411 E.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 10, at 418, 423 (describing demands made by Metropolitan
Water District and Westlands Water District during the CALFED process); see also Thompson,
Joseph Sax's Scholarship, supra note 316, at 378 (arguing that active enforcement of reasonable
use rules could introduce uncertainty and compromise markets); Frederick Cannon & Ronald
H. Schmidt, Why Water Markets are Good for California Agriculture, in ACHIEVING CONSENSUS
65-66 (arguing that clearer water rights and marketing can remove the need for an "arbitrary
'public trust doctrine'").
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argue that the flexibility promised by the public trust doctrine and
reasonable use requirement ought to be more widely invoked, and that
water rights ought to be as contingent and as subservient to evolving
community needs in practice as they are in theory.412 Meanwhile, urban
users, economists, and a mix of government bureaucrats and even
environmentalists have criticized the system's incompatibility with markets,
and its inability to simply redirect water to places, like cities, where users
would be willing to pay substantially more for it.413 Sometimes these
critiques are as opposed to each other as to the status quo-water trading
arouses widespread skepticism from some environmental advocates, and
some scholars have suggested that pro-environmental regulatory actions
could counterproductively stall markets4 14-but they derive from related
roots, as reformers view increased flexibility, if not simply top-down
reallocation, as indispensable to rationalizing the status quo system. 415
But while reformers have achieved some successes,416 legal evolution
has been incremental at best. Despite widespread attacks, the appropriative
rights regime has not fundamentally changed. Federal and state contractual
amounts are generally unaltered.411 Pricing schemes are different, but only
slightly so, and federal subsidies remain.418 No wholesale re-examination of
reasonable use requirements has taken place; instead, many of the uses Eric
Freyfogle described as "an affront to attentive citizens who know stupidity
when they see it"41 9 continue, with defenders arguing that one person's
stupidity is the foundation of another's financial future.420 Efforts to trump
the appropriative system through federally mandated agriculture-to-urban
412 E.g., Graf, supra note 10, at 264-65.
413 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supm note 53, at 1 ("relatively rigid allocations
of water and the institutions that govern them have become increasingly inefficient and harder
to justify"); Glenmon, supra note 97, at 1900 ("Agricultural interests have a stranglehold on water
in the West.").
414 Eg., Thompson, Joseph Sax's Scholarsh p, supra note 316, at 378.
415 See, e.g, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at Summary ("Properly done,
reform could improve economic efficiency in allocating water among commercial uses, provide
more water for public purposes such as the environment or Native American tribes, and could
address equity concerns regarding the portion of project costs that the public must pay.").
416 See HANAK, supra note 178 (describing moderate increases in water transfers); State
Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674, 806 n.54 (2006) (affirming that water rights
are contingent upon government determinations of environmental need).
417 See supM note 407 (describing federal contract renewals). Pursuant to the Monterey
Amendments litigation settlement, DWR and the state contractors no longer describe their full
contractual allocations as "entitlements," but those amounts are only slightly changed. See Settlement
Agreement, May. 5, 2003, at A-2, available at httpJ/www.montereyamendments.water.ca.gov/
docs/Monterey SettlementAgreement_20030715.pdf (describing removal of the word "entitlement").
418 See Envtl. Working Group, supra note 169.
419 Freyfogle, supra note 214, at 43.
420 See, e.g., supra notes 315 and 319 (quoting letters and press releases from the California
Farm Water Coalition). While the public trust doctrine has sometimes provided crucial
environmental protection, and while reasonable use challenges occasionally have succeeded, to
date those are exceptional outcomes. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 28 ("in practice courts have
hesitated to declare any use of water unreasonable").
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reallocations have met judicial rejection.421 Finally, water transfers, though
increasing, remain restrained by the foundational legal principle that water
rights are highly contextual and place-specific. 42  Consequently, the
modernized system postulated by reformers in which water rights are
readily transferable and economic principles and environmental protection
become foundational principles guiding appropriation, exists only
sporadically. 423  That absence of significant reform has important
implications for programs, like CALFED, that theoretically depend upon
adaptation; with flexibility as much an aspiration as a reality, approaches
relying upon institutional dexterity to sidestep tensions among consumption,
protection, and reliability will likely remain fragile.
CALFED's water management struggles thus illustrate the difficulties
caused by a conceptual framework that emphasizes both consumption and
protection while not addressing the consequent costs to reliability. Despite
their many innovations, the CALFED agencies endangered their success by
premising their response to the Bay-Delta's ills on the assumption that they
could reliably increase both consumption and protection, and that through
adaptation, ample funding, and managerial innovation they could finesse
whatever conflicts arose. That assumption followed convention; the
CALFED agencies were by no means unique in attempting to keep restraints
on consumption as minimal as potentially possible, and in leaving little
buffer or margin for error in their system. But they were managing a
dynamic and poorly understood system, and when natural variability or
unpredictability strikes, as it almost inevitably will, a management scheme
premised on such an approach will prove fragile. Partly because of that
fragility, an ambitious program that needed to succeed, and that had many
tools to achieve success, now appears to have failed.
V. TOWARD MORE ROBUST SOLUTIONS
The CALFED process addressed a classic environmental dilemma:
people often want more of a resource, aspire to use it more reliably, demand
protection of ecological systems dependant upon that resource, and are
reluctant to change the rules that exacerbate conflicts among these
competing goals. Similar underlying tensions emerge from debates over
energy consumption, fisheries management, and timber harvests, to provide
just a few examples. Growing populations and economies often increase
demand for natural resource consumption, which in turn increases adverse
421 In 2002, the Secretary of the Interior attempted to compel Imperial Irrigation District
(RD), a major agricultural user, to reduce its Colorado River water use in favor of Metropolitan
Water District, a major urban supplier. l1D sued the federal government, and won. See Colorado
River, Notice of Opportunity for Input, 68 Fed. Reg. 22,738 (Apr. 29, 2003).
422 See Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 124 Cal. App. 4th 245
(2004) (rejecting the SWRCB's approval of a private water banking/marketing project).
423 Metropolitan Water District, the water supplier for much of southern California, has
probably been more successful than any other agency at using marketing and innovations to
increase the reliability of its water supply. See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 97
(describing Metropolitan Water District's efforts).
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environmental consequences. Those environmental consequences create
legal risk and major economic, social, and political problems can arise if
consumption patterns must abruptly change.42 4 Just as with California's
waters, environmental dynamism and uncertainty cause resource availability
to vary, and thus resource managers, like the CALFED agencies, must
develop solutions likely to last in a changing world. Because of these
underlying similarities, the CALFED process, despite its political and
ecological intricacies, provides a useful example for understanding many
environmental crises.
CALFED's response to that challenge illustrates that when law and
policy mandate environmental protection yet encourage more consumption,
and users demand steady, predictable allocations-all against a backdrop of
environmental variability and change-only brilliant management or
engineering, plush funding, and good luck can stave off incessant conflict.
To put it very simply, the consume-to-the-brink conceptual model does not
work in an imperfect and changing world. CALFED's troubles demonstrate
the utility of a conceptual approach that reduces such conflict and responds
to the tensions between protection, consumption, and reliability. Absent
utilization of such an approach, managers will likely continue proposing
solutions with little margin for error, not realizing that the resulting
management failures are predictable outcomes rather than anomalies, and
legislators or agencies may continue promoting consumption even where
resources are scarce. CALFED's troubles also illustrate why preserving
margins of error is not excessive caution or overregulation. Instead, it is a
reasonable, if not indispensable, technique to preserve the reliability upon
which both resource users and environmental systems often depend, even as
those environmental systems change and behave unpredictably.
Recognizing tensions, though important, is just a first step; sustainable
management of scarce and dynamic resources also requires actual tradeoffs.
A reliability-based conceptual model can inform those tradeoffs, just as it
can explain tensions fostered by existing frameworks. It explains the
dangers-both environmental and economic-posed by encouraging
consumption of scarce resources, for it predicts that such encouragement
undermines reliability. Similarly, it demonstrates the practical importance of
restraining our expectations for both consumption and protection, when
both options exist, and reserving some slack in our natural systems. And
when environmental protection requirements are minimally flexible-as is
frequently the hallmark of American environmental controversies, for
controversy often starts with a protected species or ecological system in
crisis-a reliability-focused conceptual framework acknowledges that
consumption levels and reliability are inversely proportional. If protection
cannot give, and neither institutional adaptability nor engineering solutions
424 See, e.g., id at 105, 174; Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmenta Law,
31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 333 (2004) (quoting former Senator Slade Gorton's description of the
effects of measures designed to protect northern spotted owls upon logging towns); Bill
McEwen, Opinion Column, No Place to Call Home on the West Side, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 26, 2004,
at BI (describing the farmworker dislocation following agricultural land retirement).
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can resolve these basic tensions, either consumption or reliability often
must-and decreasing consumption can offer huge reliability benefits.
California's water management crises provide case studies in such
environmental inflexibility, and illustrate how such tradeoffs might be made.
Because existing law demands more protection, and because eventually
these laws may be fully enforced, efforts to increase consumption or
reliability at environmental expense are likely to prove tenuous.425 Moreover,
changing these laws is not a simple or popular proposition. The public
health,426 recreational,42 and economic428 benefits they create weigh against
reductions in protection, and provide a strong foundation for their electoral
support.429  If less easily quantifiable values like the psychological
importance of a healthy environment' ° are added to the equation,
environmental protection of water resources seems a very good
investment.431
The laws protecting California's water also reflect widely shared
normative judgments. The premises of the public trust and reasonable use
doctrines-that water is a public resource in which individual users hold
only contingent rights--are now ingrained in our legal system, and reflect
the shared intuition that a river never can entirely lose its public
425 The history of timber harvesting in the Pacific Northwest provides a cautionary tale for
any resource users counting on political muscle to trump legal mandates. Logging interests
appear to have assumed that regardless of what federal environmental laws said, their industry
was politically unstoppable. That assumption ultimately proved wrong and led to drastic
changes in national forest management. See generally YAFFEE, supra note 1 (describing this
history).
426 See 2 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 7-2 ("[ilmproved water quality can directly
improve the health of Californians, thereby improving the state's standard of living and reducing
the burden and costs on the state's healthcare system").
427 See CAL. STATE PARKS PLANNING Div., PUBLIC OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES ON OUTDOOR
RECREATION IN CALIFORNIA 26-27, 46 (2003) (showing data on recreational activities: poll
participants who fished placed a $25.90/day value on that activity); 2 2005 WATER PLAN, SUpra
note 110, at ch. 24 at 24-1 to 24-4 (pointing to the extent of recreational water uses and the
connections between water management and natural resource protection and recreational
water uses: "In 2002, about 150 million adult participation-days were spent in recreation
activities directly dependant on water... total economic output from freshwater fishing
exceeded $3 billion" in 2001).
428 See, e.g., Glen Martin, Council Opts for Lints on Wild Salmon Catch No fshing' Option
Thrown Back-Final Ruling Expected by May, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2006, at BI (discussing the
economic impact of fishing limits partly caused by environmental problems on the Klamath
River).
429 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-4, 4-25 to 4-26 (describing the economic and
public values of water resources); Thomas, supra note 10, at 10-12 (explaining the value of
aquatic biodiversity).
430 See, e.g., 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-4 (describing the tourism value of
aquatic ecosystems); at 24-2 ("Water-dependent recreation prompts long-term investments
while creating jobs in concessions, hotels, restaurants, and retail stores.").
431 Some studies attempt to quantify those values, but their measurement technique-asking
people what they would pay for preservation-is controversial and produces variable results.
Nevertheless, in its 1997 review of Reclamation's water policies, the Congressional Budget
Office noted that estimated non-use values "are two orders of magnitude greater than the
estimates for use values." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 53, at 54.
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character.43 z Environmental statutes stem from a similar philosophical fount;
they reflect widely shared perceptions that while some environmental
exploitation is allowable or even desirable, no exploiter has a right to
exterminate species or pollute without constraint.433  To limit those
principles, and render environmental protection conditional on non-
interference with, or payment to, private users, would deprive the public of
theoretically venerable rights it has recently shown little inclination to cede.
Such a shift would represent a multi-billion-dollar relinquishment of
property rights presently defined as public. Perhaps not surprisingly, popular
support for environmental protection laws remains robust, and the laws that
protect California's waters are unlikely to weaken.434 That support leaves
baseline requirements for environmental protection somewhat inflexible
and, absent solutions capable of removing zero-sum conflicts, provides
water managers with stark choices between prioritizing reliability or
consumption.
Though not equivalently legally protected, supply reliability has
tremendous practical importance." Widely fluctuating water supplies can
negate the ability of farmers to plan and sustain predictable crops. Urban
use is similarly limited in its short-term flexibility; though urban residents do
accept severe short-term cutbacks in times of drought, their suppliers have
little ability to cut users off entirely and cannot sustain draconian rationing
without severe discontent.436 Wide fluctuations also encourage costly
miscalculations, as planners optimistically assume better-year water
supplies will be the norm. 7 Most users do have some ability to
accommodate variability: some growers can fallow low-value crops, urban
areas can ration use, and multiple users receive some insurance from
reservoirs and aquifers.4 3 But as the range or suddenness of variability
432 See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,342 (1931) ("A river is more than an amenity, it
is 'a treasure."); Thomas, supra note 10, at 12-15 (describing this theory of prior public
ownership-and the ways in which existing law conflicts with it).
433 See Thomas, supra note 10, at 11-12 (describing the ethical foundations for biodiversity
protection requirements).
434 See supra note 409 and accompanying text (summarizing polling results); see also
CALIFORNIA 2025, supra note 293, at 20 (stating that Californians "favor relying on conservation
of the current water supply rather than building new dams and water storage systems").
435 See DIAMOND, supra note 86, at 152-55 (attributing many difficulties faced by past
societies in the southwest to unpreparedness for environmental change).
436 See COOLEY ET AL, supra note 191, at 45-46 (describing urban water suppliers' efforts to
maximize reliability). Even aquatic species, though adapted to some level of variability, also can
be threatened by it, particularly if their populations already are depleted and therefore
vulnerable. See also 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 9-2 (discussing the connection
between ecosystem restoration and water supply reliability, and increased reliability's potential
for fewer conflicts over endangered species).
437 See Thompson, Tragically DllTfcult supra note 72, at 262-65 (discussing propensities for
miscalculation in the face of uncertainty).
43 Some agencies use a "portfolio" approach to water supply, in which they hedge
uncertainty by holding multiple rights, or by backing up surface water supplies with
groundwater, surface water stored in subsurface banks, or desalinated seawater. See, e.g., SAN
DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHO;RITY, AN OVERVIEW (2001), available at http://www.sdcwa.org/
about/pdf/overview.pdf (describing efforts to achieve "[r]eliability [tlhrough [dliversification").
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grows, costs are likely to mount.439 A reliable but, on the average, smaller
water source thus can be more valuable than a larger but more erratic
supply or a source subject to potentially drastic cutoffs. 4a° For these reasons,
it is easy to understand why water users would want to graft more certainty
into the laws governing California water rights, and why they would fear
legal principles, like public trust and reasonable use, that theoretically place
discretion for implementing an inherent flexibility in government hands."
Similarly, reliability's benefits caution against assumptions that resource
users will knowingly accept reduced delivery reliability as the quid pro quo
that allows increased consumption. California's troubles instead suggest that
management solutions premised on flexibility and adaptation, though deeply
rooted in California water law, always have offered a partially false
promise. 4 2
If something must give-that is, if adaptive systems, ample funding, or
clever engineering cannot make these underlying tensions disappear-then
consumption, although valuable, often is the most amenable to limitation.
While California must consume lots of water, and derives many benefits from
doing so, those benefits do not require consuming as much water as California
does at present, let alone more." California's urban water use remains highly
uneven in its efficiency, and millions of acre-feet could be saved every year
through more aggressive urban conservation and recycling.' Similarly,
agricultural water use presents enormous and relatively low-cost
opportunities for use reductions. Much of California's agricultural water
nurtures high-water-demand but low-value crops. Studies have found that
when charged water prices approach market levels, growers shift production
to higher efficiency and higher value crops."5 In addition, huge volumes of
These strategies ameliorate but do not resolve uncertainty problems. Groundwater provides a
short-term hedge, but in longer droughts groundwater supplies also can be rapidly depleted, and
California's overall groundwater use currently is not sustainable. Users of multiple water
supplies may weather localized shortfalls, but in a statewide drought such hedging may be no
more effective than using index funds to insure against a general stock market downturn. See 1
2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-13 to 3-14. And while desalination might someday be
failsafe, for the foreseeable future California is not likely to have enough desalination plants on
line to provide that security. See COOLEY ET AL., supra note 191, 25-29.
439 See ENVISIONING FUTURES, supra note 1, at 105-06, 174 (contrasting the costs of slow and
rapid adjustment).
440 See id.
441 See United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 105-07 (1986) ("all
water rights are subject to governmental regulation"); Thomas, supra note 10, at 27-28, 40
(noting the inherent unpredictability of the reasonable use and public trust doctrines).
442 See supra notes 301-329 and accompanying text.
443 See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text; PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., CALIFORNIA
WATER 2030: AN EFFICIENT FUTURE 5 (2005) [hereinafter GLEICK ET AL., CALIFORNIA WATER].
444 See HANAK, supra note 178; GLEICK ET AL, WASTE NOT, supra note 190.
445 See GLEICK ET AL., CALIFORNIA WATER, supra note 443, at 26-30, 34-36 (modeling
agricultural demand under high-efficiency scenarios); HANEMANN, supra note 154, at 83; e.g.,
David Goldhamer & Elias Fereres, The Promise of Regulated Deficit Inigation in California's
Orchards and Vineyards, in 4 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-207 to 4-210 (2005);
(estimating that growers of vine and orchard crops could save between 1 and 15 million acre-
feet annually, without impacting economic yield, by using regulated deficit irrigation).
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water irrigate fields facing toxic drainage problems, which state and federal
taxpayers probably will ultimately pay to solve, and decreasing or eliminating
deliveries to those lands could save hundreds of thousands of acre-feet. 4 6
Water consumption also creates substantial collateral costs. Someone
must pay for delivery infrastructure and for mitigating the environmental
impacts of deliveries. Often that someone is the taxpayer; much water
delivery in California is subsidized, and environmental mitigation and
restoration projects typically are publicly funded. 447 Using less water can
substantially reduce energy demand, an important outcome in a state trying
to control ozone pollution, reduce its greenhouse gas footprint, and avoid
repetition of its recent rolling blackouts.48 Similarly, if less water is used,
less wastewater requires treatment and disposal."9 Consequently, using less
water can benefit both consumers and government; as with almost any other
natural resource, efficient use can bring economic rewards.4 5o
Consumption reductions are by no means without costs. As with many
natural resources, water use does generate economic benefits. No matter
how aggressively they conserve, homes still require water, and California
faces chronic housing shortages.451 By allowing more lands to be cultivated,
increased water supplies can increase agricultural activity, providing jobs,
lowering prices, and boosting rural economies. Water use is essential to
industry; making a computer chip, for example, requires lots of water.45
2
Land-based recreation similarly necessitates irrigation; the public parks and
golf courses that so many Californians value would appear drastically
different if landscaping hoses ran dry. These needs, and many others,
preclude consumption reductions from constituting an easy. fix, and the
unavoidable challenges of restraining use of a common-access resource-
California's hundreds of water-supply agencies are generally vigorous
advocates for increased exploitation of water supplies-will only add to the
political difficulties inherent in a policy of restraint. Nevertheless, tradeoffs
must be made somehow, and if environmental commitments are fairly
446 See Cal. Dep't of Water Res., Agicultural Drainage Reduction and Reuse Program,
http://www.owue.water.ca.gov/agdrain/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (describing the
amount of acres impacted); Taugher, State Plans; supra note 191.
447 See Environmental Working Group, supra note 169 (describing subsidies).
448 See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 3-16 (noting that water management consumes
approximately 20 percent of the state's total electricity, 30 percent of the natural gas, and 88
million gallons of diesel"); RONNIE COHEN ET AL., ENERGY DOwN THE DRAIN: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
CALIFORNIA'S WATER SUPPLY, at v (2004).
449 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Supra note 53, at 25 ("Conservation programs,
however, generally help reduce problems with water quality.").
450 Water use efficiency's benefits also "include better water quality and more water in
streams and rivers .... Water use efficiency can also reduce peak demand, curb runoff from
landscape irrigation, and reduce green waste caused by inefficient watering of landscapes." 2
2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 22-4.
451 Affordable and infill housing, which generally occupy smaller footprints, tend to require.
less water. See 1 2005 WATER PLAN, supra note 110, at 4-24 ("Larger residential parcels tend to
consume more water per capita than do smaller parcels.").
452 See Charles Boisseau, ffigh Tech Dependent on Plenty of Clean Water, Apr. 2005,
http://www.lcra-org/featurestory/2005/hightechwater.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
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inflexible and reliability is unavoidably important, consumption reductions
offer a promising place to start.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a recent chronicle of the impending consequences of climate
change, Elizabeth Kolbert tells a brief but revealing anecdote about
western water management. She quotes David Rind, a climate scientist at
the Goddard Institute for Space Studies, describing reactions to model
results predicting climate change could cause severe future droughts: "'I
gave a talk based on these drought indices out in California to water-
resource managers .... And they said, 'well, if that happens, forget it.'
There's just no way they could deal with that.'" 4"
Kolbert did not tell this story to fault the water managers; her criticism
instead was directed at Bush Administration's decision to respond to climate
change solely through adaptation, not prevention.4 4 But those managers'
attitude toward managing a different future-a future that will only be made
more difficult if western water managers continue to subsidize and promote
increased water consumption-suggests the inadequate paradigms
informing much environmental management. The scenario they deemed
unmanageable was an extreme, but possible, version of the probably-
recurring reality of our future, particularly if we cannot slow climate
change.45 Some resources will remain abundant, and we may find ways to
replace others, but problems with variable, scarce resources, which
presumably will remain protected by popular preferences and legal
mandates limiting environmental degradation, are likely to recur over and
over again. Whether the resource is water, energy,456 fisheries,457 forests, 45M
clean air,45 1 coastal wetlands, or something else, we are inescapably in a
world where management schemes must address dynamism and scarcity, no
matter how difficult that task may be.
The CALFED experience illustrates that our present conceptual
frameworks are ill-suited for that job. If any environmental crisis gave
traditional approaches the chance to shine, it was this one; levels of
expertise, political attention, and funding in the CALFED process far
exceeded those normally available to environmental managers, and some of
the resulting policies were genuinely creative. But the CALFED agencies'
453 See ELIZABETH KoLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 109 (2006).
454 See id at 108.
455 See, e.g, BOTKIN, supra note 93 (discussing the ubiquity of environmental variation);
DIAMOND, supra note 86, at 155 (describing the consequences of past societies' inabilities to
adjust to climate variability); OUR CHANGING CLIMATE, supra note 38, at 3-4.
456 See Canine, supra note 35 (describing the California energy crisis).
457 See supra note 82.
458 See, eg, YAFFEE, supra note 1 (describing logging controversies in the Pacific
Northwest).
459 See, eg, Fine & Owen, supra note 55, at 938-70 (discussing air quality planning in the San
Joaquin Valley).
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decision making, by discounting the basic tensions between consumption,
protection, and reliability, and placing faith that regulatory brilliance, ample
funding, and benign environmental conditions could allow increased
consumption even at the brink of environmental non compliance, laid the
foundations for solutions that would prove fragile in the face of change. The
consequences already are manifest; with species on the brink of extinction,
pump shutdowns threatening to become chronic, and agencies scrambling
back to the drawing board, an effort once hailed as a model is in shambles.
The CALFED experience amply demonstrates the need for a better way of
understanding and solving environmental problems.
By integrating the relationships between consumption, protection, and
reliability, this Article's proposed conceptual framework can facilitate better
understanding and can help environmental managers achieve more lasting
solutions. By acknowledging inherent tensions and by demonstrating that
when protection requirements are inflexible, increases in consumption
typically have direct reliability costs, this conceptual framework explains
the necessity of tradeoffs. It similarly explains the reliability risks inherent in
assuming that environmental limits are fixed and determinable, and that
consuming to those limits is desirable and safe. Finally, this framework
illustrates how maintaining margins for error and reducing consumptive
footprints can keep management schemes robust and resource allocations
reliable, even as environmental conditions change.
.1215

